


# EAST EUROPE

*A Monthly Review of East European Affairs*



**Urban Planning in Eastern Europe —**

**THE CITY OF SOCIALIST MAN**

**Decadence in Czechoslovak Poetry —**

**FLOWERS FROM THE GRAVEYARD**

**Excerpts from a Newspaper Column —**

**NOTES OF A POLISH WRITER**

**Polish Millionaires**

**Satellite Contacts Abroad**

**Family Budgets in Poland**

**Eastern Europe at the UN**

**The Moscow Declaration**

**Scholars on Russia**

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# EAST EUROPE

Formerly NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

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## THE YEAR IN REVIEW

### DECLARATIONS

IT WAS A YEAR rich in spectacle and pronouncement; but the spectacle, however entertaining or frightening, was little more than gesture, and the pronouncement was hollow with unspoken intentions and unvoiced meanings. Taken at face value, word and deed indicated a considerable increase in world tension, a heightening of postures of conflict. In this aspect the year may be considered to stand between two documents, one issued in February, the other in December. The former, a Warsaw Pact Declaration, was promulgated in the pre-summit "Spirit of Camp David"; it spoke optimistically of the introduction of "normal peacetime relations" between East and West, of "strengthening of mutual confidence," and gave Western leaders some credit for desiring peace. By the end of the year, however, after the U-2 incident and the collapse at the summit, after Khrushchev's precedent-breaking visit to the United Nations, after Cuba and the Congo, the world's Communist Parties gathered in Moscow and issued a statement in which the West, and especially the United States, were endlessly pilloried as "imperialist aggressors" bent on fomenting war—war which could only be averted because of the great strength of the "peace-loving Socialist camp."

Yet, in reality, relations between the Soviet bloc and the West have not worsened all that much; the change is more of rhetoric than anything else, just as the pre-summit promises were largely rhetorical. And, typically, the major interest of the second document lies exactly in what it leaves unspoken—the fact that the statement on the "Socialist camp's" ability to prevent war masks a bitter year-long ideological debate between the two colossi of Communism, the USSR and China. In that debate the December Declaration marks a modest victory for Khrushchev and the Soviet side; the statements that war is not inevitable, however garnished with lurid epithets for the blood-thirsty Western imperialists, essentially represent the position Moscow has held all year against the Chinese. But such paper victories are not terribly important. What is of major significance is that over a period of many months China explicitly and blatantly defied Moscow's ideological leadership, at times all but openly calling Khrushchev a heretical revisionist. This development marks China's newly strengthened determination, despite its tremendous internal difficulties, to take its own place on the world scene and, in particular, to carve out for itself spheres of influence among the new countries of Asia and Africa. This crack in the monolithic facade of world Communism was not to be mended, or even hidden, by paper.

### YUGOSLAVIA

THIS ESTABLISHMENT OF China as a bastion of "dogmatic" Communism had its inevitable effect on the internal affairs of Eastern Europe where, ever since the upheavals of late 1956, the opposite heresy of "revisionism" as personified by Tito's Yugoslavia has been the major sin. Now, with "dogmatism" increasingly pilloried, there has been an acceleration of the détente in relations with Yugoslavia. The year saw a sharp reduction in the amount of vitriol publicly poured on Tito's regime, along with an increase in Yugoslav-Satellite pacts, agreements, delegations and general togetherness. From time to time one side or the other has snarled out the old complaints and accusations, but these have become increasingly perfunctory.

### ALBANIA

THE VIVID EXCEPTION to this has been Albania. The smallest, most backward country of the area, whose regime has a tangled history of enmity toward the Yugoslav leaders, has steadfastly refused to follow the international political lead of Moscow



and the rest of the Satellites but has chosen (with China) to continue its shrill execration of Tito and all his works. Albania has also chosen to follow China's lead in the larger matters of war and peace, and was reported to be firmly on the Chinese side in the arguments in Moscow at the end of the year. There is no serious question, of course, of Albania "breaking away" from Soviet leadership in any literal sense, but its public divagation in tone and mood and its alliance with a country as disparate as China indicates the depth of ideological fission between the USSR and the rest of the East European nations, which have made or are making a "break-through" into industrialism, and those countries—China at their head—which are still wrestling with the enormous difficulties of the first steps. It is significant in this regard that those European Satellites which were reputed to be "pro-Mao"—notably Bulgaria and East Germany—had by the year's end swung in behind Khrushchev's lead.

#### ECONOMIES

THROUGHOUT THE AREA the drives toward industrialization continued without significant change of form or direction. All the regimes acclaimed their plans and programs as successful, particularly in the sectors of heavy industry and capital goods. There was, as usual, less success in the production of consumer goods and residential housing, although all the regimes promised and reiterated that greater attention would be paid to these fields, particularly housing.

The bloc's international coordinating agency, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), continued its efforts to integrate the economies of the USSR and its seven European Satellites. A COMECON meeting in July decided on further specialization in the manufacture of machinery and equipment, long-term coordination of agricultural production and the establishment of a commission for the non-military use of atomic energy. It also attempted to deal with Polish complaints that the member countries were failing to coordinate investment planning among themselves.

#### AGRICULTURE

THE TWO MOST SPECTACULAR collectivization drives took place in Hungary and East Germany. In the former country the "Socialist sector" grew from 50 percent in the fall of 1959 to more than 70 percent in the spring of 1960; however, despite successes in pressuring farmers into collectives, there was some evidence by the end of the year that peasant antipathies had forced the government to a more liberal policy on collectives' private plots. In East Germany, the Ulbricht regime announced in April that all of its farmland was in the "Socialist sector," as compared to only half at the beginning of the year. This intense campaign was motivated by the Soviet desire to appear at the May summit conference with an East Germany more thoroughly Communized than ever.

Poland continued as the agricultural exception in the bloc; Gomulka's promise that collectivization would be truly voluntary was still honored, and Polish farming remained the one large sector of private enterprise in Eastern Europe.

#### CULTURE

THE LEADING Hungarian writers Tibor Dery and Gyula Hay, imprisoned since 1956 for their part in the pre-Revolt ferment, were finally released in April. Possibly as a result, the strike of silence which had kept many Hungarian writers from publication was largely suspended, and names such as that of the poet Gyula Illyes began appearing in print for the first time in more than three years.

Poland, still by far the least repressive country in the area, continued its slow drift toward orthodoxy. Symptomatic of this was the removal, late in the year, of the young editor of *Polityka*, a weekly newspaper generally considered to be the voice of Gomulka's faction in the Party. The offending journalist was a Party stalwart, but he had permitted some frank criticism of Party activities. Frankness is increasingly unwelcome in Poland.

#### CHURCH AND STATE

SEVERAL TIMES during the year rioting broke out in Poland on matters connected with Church-State opposition; in Nowa Huta, for example, crowds intervened to prevent authorities from building a school on a site originally designated for a church. There were many accusations and counter-claims: the Church's major complaint was over the handling of religious education in public schools, while the regime accused the Church of political interference. In September the Bishops prepared a pastoral letter setting forth their grievances, but for political reasons refrained from making the letter public.



New city center in Bucharest: the Square of the Palace of the Republic.

*Romania Today (Bucharest), August 1960*

## **The City of Socialist Man**

*Urban Planning in the Soviet Bloc ►*

A CITY PLANNER casting a cool professional eye over Eastern Europe in the year 1949 might well have felt a twinge of eagerness at the perspective stretching before him. This part of Europe had never been built up on the scale of the more industrialized West, and much of it was levelled in World War II. The East European countries were now in the hands of a regime whose avowed intention was to transform the face of the land. In principle, the Communist-controlled society would demonstrate in steel and concrete the superiority of scientific long-term planning and unrestricted central authority over the capitalist urban "chaos" which grows out of a random play of private interests with no organizing principle.

But ten years later, there are nowhere to be seen the model towns based on the most advanced technology and visionary new designs of which city planners (and indeed dwellers) dream. Instead, the major East European cities, like their Western counterparts, have (in the words of Bulgarian Party chief Todor Zhivkov) "swollen like yeast," and are characterized by overcrowding, discomfort and ugliness. Transportation is overburdened; public utilities inadequate; housing and consumer service woefully short. Only the street traffic glut which is the particular bane of Western cities is absent from the East European urban scene; there, private automobiles are still a luxury and a rarity.\*

The overgrowth and congestion of metropolitan centers is, of course, a ubiquitous condition of postwar Europe and America. In Eastern Europe, the situation was brought about by the forced tempo and methods of the Stalinist industrialization program, and compounded by the farm collectivization program, which severed peasants' traditional and economic ties to their land and drove them to the cities. The urban population in agrarian Romania, for example, in the 15 years of Communist rule, increased 50 percent. At the same time, economic policy was such that little or nothing was done to provide for this influx of population. "Scientific" city planning and building was an early victim of "Stalinist priorities."

### The City Ideal

For Communists, the deformation of their cities is a reproach even on an ideological level. Marxism-Leninism is a "city" ideology, based on the theoretical dominance of an urban class and economy; its intention is to "citify" the entire nation.\*\* Agriculture is an economic necessity, but the way of life associated with it is innately "un"-Com-

\* Warsaw, for example, has a total of 53,000 motor vehicles for a population of 1.1 million.

munist (at best). The city is the matrix of the future, of the centralized, highly standardized form of social organization envisioned in the ideal Communist community.

In the past two to four years, the various East European Communist regimes have been attempting to realign their social and economic policies with orthodox Communist principles of urban development. Town planning on a nationwide basis under "Socialism" is an integral part of overall regional planning, which deals with the location and distribution of economic productive forces: industry, power and transportation.\*\*\* Town planning has a specific social as well as economic purpose: the elimination of the "differences between town and country." The basic principle here is to keep down the size of the major cities while at the same time building up the provincial districts. Small country villages are to be enlarged and merged in conjunction with the amalgamation of collective farms; ultimately they will become "agro-towns" in which farm work is organized along the lines of factory work (mechanized and specialized); the family farmhouse will disappear, and large apartment blocks rise in rows along the village streets.†

Not only regional but internal urban development is geared to the goal of "building Socialism." On an abstract level this is said to have already taken place, in so far as the city population has been homogenized in terms of class and economic function.†† More specifically, the "So-

\*\* In Eastern Europe this aspect of Marxist ideology is in pointed contrast to the parties and movements which stem from "agrarian" ideologies: i.e., which seek to glorify and preserve the ways and values of the traditional countryside. The Populist movement in Hungary is an example.

\*\*\* Regional planning was almost wholly disregarded during the Stalin era and there was little or no coordination of architectural with industrial plans. Since 1956, the East European regimes have begun to reorganize regional planning, and even sought to cooperate in this field on an international (intra-bloc) level. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance has a permanent Regional and City Planning Section which is primarily concerned with economic and urban development in border regions.

† A recent article on regional planning in Czechoslovakia stated that almost half the nation's population lives in communities of two thousand or less inhabitants, while only five cities have a population of over 100,000. Under the regional town planning concept, these five cities will be held to their present size, settlements of under two thousand will be merged, and communities of from 2,000 to 20,000 inhabitants will constitute the nuclei for expansion. (*Tvorba* [Prague], March 24, 1960.)

†† "The essential features of the Warsaw city plan are the outcome of the fundamental transformation which has occurred in the nation's social life. The Socialist principle of [equality] has been applied here in relation to the individual city districts, doing away with the previous distinction between neighborhoods of the 'rich' and the 'poor,' 'manual' and 'white-collar,' etc." (*Architektura* [Warsaw], No. 1, 1958)



A housing estate at Banska Bystrica in central Slovakia, in the Low Tatra Mountains.

*Czechoslovak Life* (Prague), February 1960

cialist" character of a city is gauged by the degree of development of its collectivist institutions such as child care centers, public canteens and other communal housekeeping services, houses of culture, etc. The present individual city plans lay the greatest emphasis on the importance of these institutions to all new housing developments. It is in them that "the distinguishing features of a Communist society will be found. . . . Under these conditions, a dwelling signifies much more than the word implies: It is not only an apartment but a nursery, shop, canteen. . . ."<sup>11</sup>

The physiognomy of the Communist city of the future was described in the Prague newspaper *Tvorba*, March 24, 1960. The city is sectioned into small self-contained settlements, separated from each other by motor speedways, and each with its own work enterprise and complete communal facilities. "In the future, the community of working people should not end at the gates of the plant, but should [encompass] the people's entire social and cultural life, so that the 'anonymous crowd' of the big city be replaced by a new sociability, based on working solidarity and good neighborly relations."

### **The Principal Cities**

**T**HE FIRST STEP in current East European city plans is the decongestion and general rehabilitation of the capital cities, the centers of government, economic life, culture, and, not least, foreign tourism. This is to be done by decentralizing industry and imposing strict checks on its expansion, both demographic and territorial. "Urban sprawl," for example, is to be checked by reversing the earlier practice of putting up new buildings on the out-

skirts of the city. The problem was exacerbated by the eruption of illegal shanty colonies which sprang up outside the city limits as a result of the housing shortage and municipal bans on the establishment of new residences inside the city.\* Now the general rule is that no major building should be undertaken on open space at the edge of the cities; instead, intensive development, using vacant lots inside the city and building taller structures, is prescribed. "We will continue to build new blocks, and whole new settlements and towns where necessary, but this must not be the main trend in town construction now."<sup>12</sup> So-called satellite cities ranged around the big cities at a distance of about fifteen miles will be developed to absorb some of the overflow population and industry; these will eventually become self-sufficient communities independent of the big city.

### **What Is to Be Built?**

In October-November 1959, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party held a town planning and construction plenum, at which Party leader Todor Zhivkov was the major speaker and exponent of the new policies in this sphere. In his main speech, Zhivkov said that the key difference between capitalist and "Socialist" policy in architecture and building is that the former builds factories and palaces for the capitalists at the expense of housing for the workers, while the goals of Communism are "to serve the cultural and material needs of man."<sup>13</sup>

"Factories and palaces" were, however, precisely what

\* Legal restrictions and qualifications regarding new residents are still in force in Warsaw and Sofia.

was built by the Communist States during the entire decade of the 1950's. Stalinist building was polarized between two extremes: monumental State and Party administrative buildings in the centers of the capitals, on one hand; on the other, huge industrial plants and complexes. Both kinds of buildings were symbols of the "new order," the first glorifying its civil power, the other the economic. The common feature of both was that neither was for the use or welfare of the people; completely and deliberately neglected was the entire middle range of building: houses, shops, restaurants, etc.

This failure is now acknowledged an egregious failure of Communist rule in Eastern Europe. The housing crisis is, indeed, a serious political issue, with both domestic and external ramifications. Internally it has been a prime and continuing source of popular resentment; and is a serious soft spot in the current Kremlin propaganda tactic of selling the Communist system abroad on its record of material accomplishment.

Thus it is that the most urgent, and publicized, objective in East European city planning is the complete elimination

of the housing shortage by a specific target date.\* This feat is to be brought about through two measures: a crash housing construction program, and the imposition of an absolute "ceiling" on the number of inhabitants in each city.

## Budapest

Over 50 percent of Hungary's industry (46 percent of all workers employed in State industry) and an even larger share of its commerce is concentrated in Budapest. At the Seventh Party Congress in December 1959, it was decreed that no new industry is to be set up in Budapest and some of the existing plants will be relocated. Under the master (20-25 year) plan, the population of the city is to be held to a maximum of 2.3 million (1960: about 1,800,000). The plan prescribes the construction of satellite towns, of about 35,000 inhabitants each, in a 25-50 kilometer radius around Budapest, to which industry and workers will be diverted.

Reconstruction of buildings, bridges, etc. destroyed or damaged in World War II has still not been completed, but priority has been given by the Kadar regime to rapid repair of visible scars (e.g., the site of the Kilian Barracks) of the 1956 Revolt. A special restoration plan, to be completed in 1968, has been worked out for the old inner city and its monuments and historical sites. The Royal Castle, destroyed during the war, will be rebuilt not in its prewar neo-baroque style but in its Renaissance form of 500 years ago. It will accommodate national museums and a library, and its surrounding area will become an office district.

Current building plans include the construction of a new radio-television center and a permanent trade fair grounds of 40 hectares. Sports grounds and a new stadium (in addition to the 100,000-capacity People's Stadium built during the first Five Year Plan) are being built, apparently to strengthen the regime's perennial bid for the Olympic Games. Also for the foreign tourist trade, the hotels along the Danube bank are being reconstructed, and several new ones are in progress, including a spa hotel on the site of the city's mineral springs. Park areas are to be doubled in the next few years.

Public transportation in Budapest is notably inadequate. Billions of *forint* were invested during the 1950-53 period in an east-west subway, but even by 1965 only a small section of it will be completed. The master long-range plan calls for the construction of a north-south subway as well as extension of the line built in 1896 (Europe's first).

\* The announced target of the long-range (15-year) Budapest development plan is "a separate apartment for every family in Budapest." (*Magyar Nemzet*, August 23, 1959). The same goal is to be realized according to the Czechoslovak economic plan by 1970.

The living space "norm" or ideal quota has been established by the Communists as nine square meters per person. The current average in the city of Sofia is five. In Warsaw the living space ratio is now about 2 persons per room. In Hungary, there were 3.68 persons per apartment in 1941; by 1958, the figure had risen to 4.5, even though many of the original apartments had been chopped up and thus reduced in size. Only 300,000 new apartments were built in Hungary in the 15 postwar years. In Romania, 31,000 apartments were scheduled to be built in 1960; this is one third of the total number of apartments built in the 1950's.



Jerolimskie Avenue, a main street of Warsaw, glitters at night.

Stolica (Warsaw), October 16, 1960

### THE HOLE IN THE MIDDLE

Excerpt from an article by Andrzej Braun in *Nowa Kultura* (Warsaw), February 22, 1959.

"We recently saw a documentary, or rather a journalistic film, for this is how we should describe this type of film which proclaims a thesis, or brings to the fore certain explicit problems. Such films, based on specially edited shots, have a simply amazing visual impact. . . . This 'short' showed us something which we all actually knew, but never before realized so acutely, that Warsaw is just like that pretzel in Pilsudski's well-known metaphor—everything that's anything is on the outskirts, while the center is nothing but an empty hole. The largest housing communities and the entire construction push is moving farther and farther away into the more and more remote suburbs: buildings and streets are plowing right into wheat, potatoes and woods, and the

downtown desert serves only as a through road. The Palace of Culture "Church" stands right at the edge of [that] road.

The film uses one simple tactic: the [central] square is photographed from all sides through the foreground. Thus, the Czestochowa tower of the Palace is seen through mountains of grass-covered rubble, through grazing goats, through old construction site barracks, through empty, houseless streets cleared out after the ex-city [ruins], through emptiness, rubbish and dilapidated shacks. The spoken commentary runs: 200 meters north from the center, 100 meters west from the center, 500 meters from the center, 600. . . . The film acts like an electric shock—the downtown section around the Palace is a desert or a semi-rural area. After this there is no doubt in anybody's mind that it is high time to fill out the center of the city, this hole in the pretzel. . . ."

### Sofia

The Sofia plan aims at trimming the ragged edges of the city, an area not encompassed in previous Sofia plans. The territory of illegally-built houses on the city's outskirts covers an area of 2,100 hectares and includes almost 30,000 people. Under the current plan, part of this area is included in the city limits, and a total Sofia population of about 900,000 is expected by 1975.\*

Much of the urban development in Bulgaria is concentrated in the regime's current pet projects, the Black Sea resorts. The old towns of Varna and Nessebur have been expanded and two completely new resorts, "Golden Sands" and "Sunny Shores," have been developed.

### Prague

The Prague city plan departs from the prevailing principles of Soviet bloc urban development in several respects. It lays maximum stress on preserving the city's traditional appearance, and, therefore plans to build skyscrapers on the American or Soviet model were scrapped in 1955. (However, because of lack of building space, ten-to-twelve story apartment houses are now being built.)

According to the 1961-65 plan, the population, now about one million, is to be held to a maximum of 1,300,000, and no new industry is to be located in the city. Sixteen complete new residential settlements (each accommodating about 35,000 people) are to be built on the outskirts. Of the total of 37,000 new apartment units to be built by 1965,

less than one-tenth will be located on existing vacant sites in the middle of the city. The green area is to be almost tripled. The principle of building satellite towns around the capital has been rejected as unsuitable for the Prague region.

### Bucharest

Visitors report a flurry of building in Bucharest, almost all of it apartment houses. A new city center has just been completed which offers a striking contrast to the "imperial" city centers in, for example, Sofia, built during the Stalin era. Instead of the massive office buildings and "palaces," the Bucharest center is composed of a planted square bounded on three sides by modern, functional apartment houses with ground-floor shops, and on the fourth by a concrete shell auditorium for concerts, plays and conventions.

### Warsaw

The development of Warsaw is charted in a master long-range (25-30 year) plan laying down the general lines, and in a series of short-term plans covering the details to be realized in progressive stages. The master plan applies not only to the city proper but to the existing settlements around it which will eventually constitute the Warsaw "conurbation" with a total population of 2.5 million. (The present population of the city proper is 1.1 million.)

Because the center suffered the most radical damage during the war, the city is being rebuilt from the suburbs inward, resulting in a system of individual city quarters running in concentric strips toward the center. This pattern will be retained.

The current short-term plan (1959-65) is heavily concentrated on housing, Warsaw's most pressing requirement. The number of dwelling rooms in the city totals 650,000.

\* Sofia had a population of 300,000 in 1949. The reconstruction plan drawn up at that time provided for an expansion to 700,000 at the end of 30 years. But in less than ten years the population was 750,000, and current plans are geared to 900,000. This "explosion" is not confined to Sofia; the situation in the other large Bulgarian towns such as Plovdiv, Varna and Russe is comparable.



The Palace of Science and Culture, a classic example of "Socialist realist" architecture of the Stalin era, rises in the center of Warsaw.

*Architectura (Warsaw), January 1958*

For an expected 1965 population of 1,400,000, new accommodations must be built for more than 200,000 people, in addition to relocating "thousands of families now living in shacks, barracks, cellars and attics." The plan calls for 287,000 rooms with the object of reducing the ratio of persons per room from two to 1.6 by the end of 1965.<sup>4</sup>

The main civic construction planned or already under way is the Grand Theater Opera House, which will be a theatrical arts center with 350,000 cubic meters of building covering almost five acres in the heart of the capital. A multi-story hotel and an office building for a foreign trade enterprise will be built near the now-isolated Palace of Culture and Science. Plans have been made to reconstruct the Royal Castle destroyed during the war.

Improvement of city transportation is an important though subordinate goal of the Warsaw plan. The costly Warsaw subway project, begun during the Stalin era, has been abandoned as technically unfeasible. The present plan is to expand the streetcar system (although this form of transportation is gradually being discarded in most modern cities.)

The 1959-65 projects will cost an estimated 15 billion *zloty*. Most of this will be provided by the State, but, according to the Polish press, there is a shortage of available funds which will have to be made good by the city treasury.

Warsaw is a city to which strong civic sentiment has always attached. The inhabitants' pride in it is memorialized in the reconstructed Old Town, rebuilt stone by stone and considered one of the outstanding feats of restoration in postwar Europe. But much of the reaction to present-day Warsaw is outspokenly negative. In 1958, the liberal weekly *Nowa Kultura* sponsored an architecture con-

ference, at which a number of Warsaw's leading citizens—writers, architects, sociologists—expressed their views on the look and "feel" of the city of today.

A perceptive analysis, in a subjective vein, was made by writer Kazimierz Brandys. "Warsaw in its 'scaffold period', when no one yet knew how it would look, somehow made people feel better than now when it has theoretically been rebuilt, or at least has assumed a shape," Brandys said. "The scaffolding gave rise to hope, opened tremendous possibilities in the mind, but the subsequent period, when the scaffoldings came down, brought disappointment. People do not feel comfortable in the city. They see its ugliness.

"I will not speak of urban problems because I do not know them. I can speak only of what I see from the sidewalk or the street. Recently I saw Aleje Jerozolimskie [a main thoroughfare] and the sight did not please me at all. [Its design is] dominated by the principle of the dead wall. The result is depressing and anti-human. It's the same with the Warecki Palace environs, as well as Mazowiecka and Swietokrzyska Streets. Before, as you gentlemen must well remember, this part of town was lively and permeated with culture. It was dotted with cafes frequented by the literary world, with antique shops and book stores. Today it is a section of empty office corridors; the streets are traversed not by passersby, but by customers. Did it have to happen that way?

"Warsaw is a city which used to give the impression that it could afford big gestures, while at the same time retaining a characteristic, nonchalant air. Today that atmosphere can be found on the inside, among people, in conversation, but not in the street. . . ."

## A NEGLECTED ART

*Excerpts from an editorial comment in Przegląd Kulturalny (Warsaw), November 24, 1960.*

"We must admit that for some unknown reason architecture has become an anonymous art. Buildings are anonymous, housing developments are anonymous, whole towns are anonymous. I would bet dollars to doughnuts that 95 percent of readers of the cultural press do not know the name of the builder of Nowe Tychy [a complete new industrial town in Silesia] and that the most prominent names in the profession are known only to professionals and their families. This is wrong, if only because sometimes one does not know whom to blame.

"I am greatly annoyed—and would like to cite this as an example—with the methods [of our press] of describing the Polish exhibitions and stands at international fairs. On the first page of a daily appears an article which describes the opening ceremony; tells who cut the ribbon; explains who was in the Polish delegation all


the way down the line to the fourth assistant of the third Secretary; then, in a rapid resume, proclaims the success of Polish washing machines, electric irons, and snails; ending with an optimistic note on the development of contacts. . . . The truth of the matter is that Polish exhibition architects are in an international class, that at every exhibition the Polish stand is a sensation; and common sense alone would dictate that the name of the artist be publicized, since a man who by his skill and good taste can 'save' an exhibit of Polish radios about whose artistic value there may be some doubt, deserves recognition. The Polish Bureau of Foreign Trade has managed to find a whole corps of [such] specialists, and create such conditions for them that our exhibits are on the highest level, and it is curious that [our] press is unable to notice the fact. . . . I shuddered when I was told that Radio Free Europe in Munich, about which we have our own opinion, wrote peans in praise of the architect who created the Polish pavillion at the Munich Fair, while in the Warsaw press I could read only that Polish cucumbers were very popular at the fair."

An architect, Adolf Ciborowski, elaborated on this feeling of malaise, in more concrete terms: he cited the raw, "half-finished" effect of the city and called for a "stabilization" of its appearance. "Whether in the center or one of the new suburbs, there is an incomplete look: lawns still have to be seeded, trees planted, buildings plastered, or even built on still empty lots." An important task in the reconstruction program should be the proper finishing of individual sections and fragments of the city, thus dispelling the "impression of temporariness."

Another leading Polish architect, Stanislaw Jankowski, criticized the commercial section: "Longing for the downtown store is easily detected in many of the discussions on Warsaw's reconstruction. . . . We want 'real stores'—and rightly so. With a well-lighted show window and a neon sign. But we must admit honestly: what is there to advertise today . . .?" Jankowski said that the fault of the new State-built commercial facilities is not poorly designed stores, but their "inadequate contents." People pass without interest these "virtually empty almost-stores, while the tiny shops on Mokotowska Street or the Trzech Krzyzy Square are still attractive and Targowa Street, with its honest-to-goodness shops, is simply bubbling over with activity. . . ."

## Provincial Decay

THE CONCENTRATION of economic and political activity in the big cities has been accompanied by the neglect and material deterioration of provincial towns, many of them old historical and cultural centers. A report on



The Kadar regime raised this new apartment house at the corner of Ullai Street and Korut, scene of some of the heaviest street fighting which took place in the Hungarian capital during the 1956 Revolt.

*Hungarian Review (Budapest), October 1959*

Cracow in Poland in the summer of 1959 warned that the buildings in the vicinity of the old fort were in danger of imminent collapse. Out of 98 buildings inspected, 30 "are a constant threat to the life of the inhabitants," according to *Głos Pracy* (Warsaw), August 18, 1959. The paper stressed the urgency of relocating families and businesses and for radical reconstruction in the area.

Of Lublin, whose chief distinction in modern times was its position as site of the Moscow-formed wartime Lublin Committee, a correspondent in *Kurier Polski* (Warsaw), May 2, 1959, commented that "today it differs from . . . any small country town in only one way—it's bigger."

The *Kurier Polski* reporter declared that "The city is dying. . . . I remember the things happening here in 1944-45. It was a melting pot in which bubbled and boiled a new State, new life. . . . But the period of panegyrics and laurels which were showered upon the city when it housed the Red Army and the 'first' Polish government was short-lived. It was then that, with drum-beating and fanfare, the Communists unveiled to the world the Starowka [historical] section of the city, reconstructed and restored to its old splendor."

But a few months later (the symbolism is obvious): ". . . the plaster started to crack, the gypsum decorations fell off and litter covered the Renaissance dadoes . . . water began seeping in here, something came tumbling down there . . . and Lublin became the object of universal public disgust."

Although this situation is extreme in Poland, the deliberate neglect of the old provincial cities was typical of all the Stalinist regimes. In Bulgaria, it was reported at the town planning plenum that in some towns the regime had done no major building since its accession, and that a number of them (Stanke Dimitrov and Gabrovo were cited) are still without a central sewage system, household running water, etc. "This did not happen fortuitously," Party leader Zhivkov admitted.

### The New Socialist Towns

Keystones in "Socialist" regional and town development are the new industrial cities created during Stalin's era in connection with the development of heavy industry centers: Nowa Huta in Poland, Sztalinvaros in Hungary, Dimitrograd in Bulgaria, Kosice in Czechoslovakia. Their first purpose is to serve the economic program, but they also have a symbolic propaganda function as showplaces of regime accomplishments and intentions.

The sites of the new towns are determined by the location of raw materials or existing industries. The center and heart of the town is a steel foundry, a power station or a chemical plant, prominently situated at the top of a rise or the end of a long boulevard. These are meant to be functional "efficiency" communities of workers; work-centered and including all the facilities necessary to Socialist collectivist living: canteens, day nurseries, etc.

The "new Socialist" towns are regime pets, are always extolled in the press and placed on the agenda of visiting foreign delegations. But in fact two of them figured prom-

### "NOWA HUTA—FACTS"

On Poland's new industrial town, from *Nowa Kultura* (Warsaw), June 14, 1959

This city's calendars and clocks are inaccurate—time must be measured differently. Not only has the external appearance of the city's streets changed, but also the life of its inhabitants, and all at a tempo that is probably unmatched anywhere else in Poland. . . .

The most recently built communities, C and D, are simple and economical in line, with large windows and many balconies, and those houses which have already been plastered are colorful and gay looking. Orange, yellow, blue. Bold contrasts, plenty of space for landscaping—for shrubs and trees, which are not there yet because the construction sites still have not been cleared, but which next Spring will shoot up to reach the hanging glass balconies. If you want to see the Mariensztat [housing project in Warsaw in classic Stalinist style] type of housing, you must go to the first-built community—A. Fortunately, the fad for sugar-coating and candelabra is past. Now everything is color and glass, simple and comfortable.

This last is particularly important. Apartments have wall closets, kitchens are well equipped, and we could lead groups of sightseeing foreign architects to the almost 400 beautifully planned city stores. In the older blocks and squares wash is still hung out on lines, but the new blocks already have attics, laundries and garages. Construction, now based on pre-fabricated material, is progressing rapidly (construction costs have decreased by approximately 18 percent.). . . . Series of identical models are being constructed. . . .

As was said before, the city has been considerably stabilized. They have liquidated half of the hostels established in apartment houses, the so-called blocks of yellow curtains [identical curtains hanging in all the windows] which have now been converted into regular family dwellings. Besides that, the Nowa Huta residents want to live in properly finished blocks. In communities which are still under construction, they complain about lack of sidewalks and landscaping. Those whose homes have not yet been plastered paint their balcony alcoves and balustrades in various colors. This later adds to the difficulties of architects and builders who often have to repaint them to maintain the overall architectural effect. But cases of apartment defacement, which only two years ago constituted the bulk of [court?] cases, have all but disappeared from the books. . . . This does not mean, of course, that absolutely everyone now takes proper care of his apartment, but rather that instances of bathrooms being converted into chicken coops have now become more or less sporadic and that respect for immediate surroundings is growing: for stairways, yards, lawns, communal attics and laundries.

The lives of the city's inhabitants have been affected in no small measure by the fact that the central heating system is finally working properly, that the apartment

are warm in the winter, that there are plenty of well supplied stores and no lines in front of them. . . .

Nowa Huta now has 91,000 inhabitants. The majority come from Cracow [Province] villages. . . . Although the population influx during the past two years has been rather small—1,000 new residents—the city's natural growth has increased considerably, from 1,517 children born in 1956 to 2,320 in 1958. The number of illegitimate children has decreased greatly. . . . The average age of newlyweds has not changed: among the men it stands at between 20 and 26 years and the women, between 19 and 21. It should also be noted that young couples do not come to their civil wedding ceremonies dressed in cotton-quilted coats as was the case not so long ago, that the brides frequently carry bouquets and that even some of the parents attend the civil ceremonies. But the church wedding is still considered to be the real ceremony and is usually followed by a boisterous wedding party. . . . All these weddings, christenings, etc., are the most important element of social life in Nowa Huta.

Two working members is still the average ratio per family. Mean wages have increased slightly in the steel plants (they now stand at 1,500 zloty) and considerably in machinery enterprises (now at 1,800 zloty). . . . The demand is greatest for electricians, plumbers and unskilled laborers. . . . There will be need for 12,000 more workers by 1965. The foundry plants themselves will be able to employ another 10,000, since new furnaces are planned which will be bigger than the three now operating. The foundry's annual production should then reach 3.3 million tons of steel.

There are problems in Nowa Huta which point up the city's life, directly influence its character, and help pave the path along which it goes, so to speak. Undoubtedly at the head of the list are the workers' hostels. Before—in the early Fifties—they actually were the city. Even the apartment houses were converted into these hostels. The city's population served the needs of the steel giant. Later, very slowly, apartments were gradually turned over to families. But then came 1954—the second stage of foundry construction—and the hostels filled once again, yellow curtains appeared in all the windows of the city. 26,000 people lived in hostels at that time. This means that none of them had any family life, that they lived one on top of the other, that they ate bread with dry sausage and suffered stomach disorders, that they spent most of their wages on vodka, that there were constant fights and that life was bad. It was then that [Adam] Wazyk came to Nowa Huta, looked around, lost his perspective and wrote a shocking poem.\*

The following years brought a reversal in policies concerning the city. This is best expressed in the sudden decline of the number of people billeted in hostels: . . . 1955, 21 thousand; 1956, 16 thousand . . . and this

year [1959] there are now only eight thousand. Please note: the third stage of the foundry's development is now beginning. . . .

It can reasonably be said that everyone living here is in the process of improving his or her financial status. People are furnishing their apartments, buying lamps, carpets, curtains, washing machines and TV sets. There are already 330 TV sets, although as yet there is no television transmitting station in Cracow. . . .

Nowa Huta apartments, as such, are rather nice, but hideously furnished. Several architects complained to me that these lovely interiors of which, after all, there are many in the new blocks, are being scarred by heavy furniture. But where are people supposed to get new furniture? Who is to teach them how to decorate their apartments? There is not one advisory clinic (with one exception) in the whole of Nowa Huta. . . . I don't know of any other city in Poland which is more in need of such. . . . After all, the overwhelming majority of these people had completely different living and eating habits until only very recently. . . .

When I visited Nowa Huta two years ago the director of the local PKO [Savings Bank] complained that the people were not banking their savings. At that time the PKO could only boast of several student savings accounts with penny deposits. And yet people had money. They were paying cash for motorcycles and twin bedroom sets. They kept their money in stockings and mattresses. Now the PKO holds 14,000 accounts and the average account is 2,600 zloty. . . .

Nowa Huta has several movie houses, the Theater of Dolls [puppets] organized by the very active and enterprising artists' colony, and, of course, the People's Theater, Skuszanki, which is known to everyone in Poland. . . .

Nowa Huta needs activists. Different ones. Not necessarily with sociology doctorates, but very necessarily with imagination, sensitivity and wisdom. The originality of Nowa Huta life is unquestionable. Every old method ends in failure. In this city you cannot organize anything that is faithfully copied from rural traditions, nor even anything that is highly effective in large urban centers. We must choose the happy medium, different and specific, as specific as the Nowa Huta way of life. For example, somebody organized a youth club, complete with rock and roll, jazz and bridge. It didn't take. Someone else organized Youth Days, stiff, peasant-y, and very slow. It didn't take. Because Nowa Huta actually lives on the border line between these styles. . . .

Once, Nowa Huta electrified the whole of Poland. Today we know less than ever about it.

Near Cracow stands an industrial giant and a ten-year-old city. . . . Since the beginning 8.4 billion zloty has been spent on the Lenin Foundry, 2.8 billion on the city [Nowa Huta] itself, and 626 million on culture and art for the newly-born working class.

\* "A Poem for Adults," one of the classics of the thaw (ed.).

inently in the protest movements of 1955-56: Nowa Huta, as the theme of Adam Wazyck's threnody "A Poem for Adults"; and Sztalinvaros, as a center of anti-Soviet resistance during the Hungarian Revolt.

That some of these towns turned into giant slums before they were completed has been amply documented in the Soviet bloc press during the pre-revolt "thaw." Living conditions were infamous. Crime, juvenile delinquency, labor turnover, alcoholism soared as a result of lack of social and recreational facilities and insupportable housing conditions. In the construction of these towns, housing and factories were theoretically to be built at the same rate, but the former fell far behind because it was not in the "production sector." Refugees described workers' barracks in which 300 persons were quartered in one open hall without adequate plumbing and ventilation. Married couples were separated for months and years.

About six weeks before the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolt, the Budapest paper *Nepszava* (September 5, 1956) published a trade union shop committee report on conditions in Sztalinvaros, in which it was charged that, while plant buildings and equipment were of the highest standard, 50 percent of the workers were living in temporary barracks with no partitions or heating. When the Revolt broke out, Sztalinvaros, Hungary's foremost proletarian city, (whose name was immediately changed back to Dunapentele by the inhabitants) became a rebel stronghold and one of the last to succumb to the superior Soviet forces.

### Rural Town Development

"Our villages present a joyous picture now," said Bulgarian leader Zhivkov to the town planning plenum. "Within a very short period their appearance has altered. Our old villages—steeped in mud and dust, with their dilapidated houses set against the background of the church, the tavern, the landlords' houses, the grocery and the cultural club built with the toil of the population—have now disappeared. They are but history."

As in the cities, it is essential to halt the random construction of houses over a wide area extending miles beyond the original limits, Zhivkov emphasized. This is particularly important in the villages, which must be more centralized in view of the developing public services and communal facilities.

Farm buildings must be planned and standardized. "Not just any kind" of cowshed, pigsty, chicken house, built "just anywhere" will do. This question is not just one for the kolkhoz administrations; in the future, the construction of farm buildings must be related to general town planning.

In Czechoslovakia, building in the villages was criticized as "anarchic" and "in conflict with the principles of the modern construction of communities." In Slovakia, some towns are following the discredited practice of "linear" building—i.e., putting up new buildings in single rows along the highways. In planning public and social services "it is frequently not taken into consideration that a neighboring kulak holding may in the near future be converted into a collective farm or dairy. The change of the social order, the conversion of small production into large-scale Socialist production is being carried out according

to planned directives . . . and principles fully verified in the USSR. It is essential that construction be planned accordingly, and that production, housing, social and cultural projects be coordinated."<sup>5</sup>

### Housing

**H**OUSING CONDITIONS are indeed "the shame of the cities" in Eastern Europe—and of the regimes. Poland, whose major cities were almost uniformly reduced to rubble, emerged at the end of the war with one of the most severe housing shortages in Europe; fifteen years later, it still has one of the most severe housing shortages in Europe. This is so despite provisions for housing construction contained in the Bierut regime's Six Year Plan (1951-56) of which *Miasto* (Warsaw), December, 1956, wrote derisively: "As the Six Year Plan is drawing to its end we are beginning to realize more and more the difficult situation which exists in housing. . . . The statistical juggling which was to prove that the Plan's housing program had been 'theoretically' fulfilled did not help. . . . Everyone knew of the actual state of affairs and considered all the attempts to conceal the failure as nothing but plaster over an open wound."

In addition to insufficient production of housing (new or reconstructed), there was consistent short-cutting in the design, basic equipment (utilities and plumbing),\* quality of construction and maintenance of such building as was carried out. Slipshod building methods and inferior material resulted in precipitous deterioration of the buildings. All of these shortcomings were the result of two principles of Stalinist economics: scanting capital investment in "non-essential" services, and keeping rents down below costs. *Miasto* (Warsaw) September, 1957, accused the pre-Gomulka regime of putting up makeshift buildings on the assumption that they would "somehow" hold

\* In 1950 only 40 percent of apartments in Poland had running water and less than 15 percent fully equipped bathrooms (1958 *Political & Economic Annual*, Warsaw).



Hungary's Sztalinvaros: "A town without any past—or slums."

*Hungarian Review* (Budapest), December 1959

together until heavy industry had been built up, after which it would be possible to replace them. Further, "it was a cardinal error to 'give away' apartments at a rent which did not even cover the cost of water, gas and electricity, not to mention repairs."

A grim picture of families compressed into narrow dark rooms was given at the Bulgarian town planning plenum by Party CC Secretary Pencho Kabudinski, who indicted the apartment houses built during the Stalin era when "foreign [i.e., Soviet] experience was brutally copied without taking into consideration our own climate, habits and way of life" and "economies were sought in the functional plan of the house without regard to comfort, unity of form and furnishings. . . ." He quoted a letter from one Elena Traykov in Plovdiv, lamenting the smallness of the rooms in her apartment house, particularly that of the kitchen where it is the custom for Bulgarian families to spend much of their time in the winter months.

In addition to lack of space, great discomfort is caused by the flimsiness of the structures, Kabudinski said. Heat and sound insulation is so poor that every noise can be heard by neighbors, and "internal plumbing installations are poor and cause great inconvenience." Despite all measures recently taken by the regime, there has been no appreciable improvement in quality; in many cases it has deteriorated. He scored such "inadmissible occurrences" as the necessity for beginning to repair a house immediately after it has been built.<sup>6</sup>

A peculiarly iniquitous practice of the earlier period was the construction by the State of intentionally substandard housing. These included so-called "midget dwellings" in Bulgaria and "reduced value" apartments in Hungary, the latter generally consisting of a single room with no bath in old suburban one-family houses. These have been repudiated by the current administrations and are explicitly banned in the new plans. Of the midget dwellings, Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov said: "Some time ago the construction of such midget dwellings began in Sofia, and spread from there throughout the country. We—several members of the Politburo—went to see them. They are not dwellings but boxes. For this reason we have proposed to the Politburo that . . . this type of construction should end.

"The blame for these dwellings does not rest on the Sofia Comrades [Party officials]. It was our [the top echelon's] idea, but it did not prove very practical. Maybe as a temporary measure midget dwellings should be built, but this must not become a trend."<sup>7</sup>

The new housing policy calls for not only more but better accommodations. Houses in Bulgaria, the regime recently declared, must be built to last for as long as 100 years. The current Hungarian Five Year Plan allocates 5 billion *forint* for repair and maintenance of apartment buildings and the replacement of substandard housing (primarily in five slum districts of Budapest). Czechoslovakia will begin a similar slum clearance and renewal program, but not until the end of the fourth Five Year Plan in 1970. In Poland such a program is considered beyond the country's present economic possibilities. In 1957



"Overlooked corners of Warsaw—From the ugly boarding, from behind garbage pails, the cultural life of Warsaw is proclaimed!"

Stolica (Warsaw), August 9, 1959

the Polish Council of Ministers, decreeing that "the public must assume responsibility for certain additional costs," raised rents to "a level assuring proper maintenance and amortization of apartment houses."

### Costs

While the "false" (and inhuman) economies of Stalinism in regard to housing have been thoroughly aired and disgraced, expense continues to be a prime consideration in town planning and building. In order to realize the goals of the building program, two measures are considered essential by the regimes: a radical reduction in construction costs, and maximum utilization of "private resources"—both of labor and funds.

Building costs in the Soviet bloc are consistently and conspicuously higher than in the West. This is attributed by the regimes to faulty organization and work practices in the building industry and its continued use of technologically outmoded methods and materials. The familiar phenomenon of costs rising ahead of the building itself and ultimately far exceeding original budgets is emphatically scored by the regimes. Then, correction of errors in the construction and the need for immediate repairs add greatly to the final cost of the building.

Planning authorities are now insisting on more rational selection of sites for building, utilizing existing public utilities (water, gas, etc.) and local building materials, and above all, the implementation of a cost control system. In a July 1959 report to the Central Committee, Romanian leader Gheorghiu-Dej said that the average cost of an apartment had been reduced in Romania from 73,800 *lei* in 1956 to as low as 36,000 *lei* in 1959. In Bulgaria, however, despite repeated pledges by the regime to lower them, housing costs have risen steadily in the past two years.

## THE HAZARDS OF LIVING HIGH

A comment on life in one of Warsaw's new apartment houses, by the popular Warsaw columnist "Wiech" (Stefan Wiechecki), in *Stolica* (Warsaw), October 23, 1960.

"You can't satisfy the other man, no matter how hard you try. Even if you anoint him with honey and sprinkle him with diamond dust, he'll still stick to his guns, complaining and complaining.

"That's how it is with the new tenants in those there new Warsaw skyscrapers. In that one, for instance, lives my so-called friend, one Fijolek. All the way up there, in the crow's nest, on the tenth floor—here Mr. Piecyk pointed with the tip of his bamboo cane to the top floor of a beautiful building, before which we had paused on our reconnaissance tour of new building projects in his home district of Praga [Warsaw suburb].

"See that? That's his underwear hanging out on the balcony, 'cause they don't make them new buildings with attics and you gotta dry the wash in the basement. But no regular Varsavian is going to hang his Monday wash, or even his in-between wash, in the cellar. Somehow it doesn't seem honorable, if you know what I mean. And in this case Fijolek does have some reason to gripe. But he turns up his nose at everything. For instance, he doesn't like the height. But the guy does seem to have cockeyed luck. His old pad, in Rybna 4, was in the basement, and now that he's got a new one, right away it's gotta be all the way up on the tenth floor. So, he's havin' trouble gettin' climatized, he can't catch up with his standard of livin', it's gone way over his head. But you should see the view, the air,

the two rooms and kitchen he's got now, instead of the small hole in the wall he had before. And still he complains, says he can't enjoy the view for the panting and the pain in the back."

"I don't get it, what has that got to do with the view? Maybe your friend is afraid of heights?"

"You try reachin' the tenth floor with no pain in the back and other complications. And then see if you still wanna enjoy them bird's-eye views."

"What do you mean reach? Walking? There aren't any elevators?"

"Yeah, sure there are, but not every day, more often than less they're outta kilter and then the guy hasta kick up that skyscraper on his own power. And on the other hand he also had some words with his mother-in-law because o' that elevator. Bein' a lady of the old school, she ain't gettin' into that contraption for all the tea in China. She's afraid something might happen to her. And it did, too. She got in just once and got herself a broken collarbone."

"Amazing. What happened? The elevator move suddenly?"

"It wasn't that. Only Fijolek was so set on getting wifey's mother into that elevator that he used force. He had the whole family helpin' to squoosh her in until they finally broke her collarbone in the door. After that she swore a solemn vow in church never to get into the contraption again."

"So now she never goes out, does she?"

"Once a month, and then she's three days on her way up. Spends the night with friends on the third and seventh floors. . . . But Fijolek complains most about his cold."

## Standardization

The hoped for solution to the problem of building costs in the Soviet bloc lies in mass production and standardization, both of building parts—prefabricated wall panels, floors, etc., which can be assembled on the spot (about 90 percent of building in the USSR uses this method now), and of plans and blueprints. Buildings assembled according to prepared standard blueprints which can be used for many buildings are, it is claimed, some 20 percent cheaper than those built from individual plans. (According to the Bulgarians, who hope to apply this method to 60 percent of their housing construction by 1965, from 60 to 70 percent of housing construction in Poland and Czechoslovakia is now following standardized blueprints) [*Rabotnichesko Delo*, November 5, 1959].

In Hungary a Planning Center for Standardized Building is being organized under the Ministry of Construction to blueprint the 1961-65 building plan and work out standardized models of houses, schools, etc. An experimental residential settlement, a sort of architectural "laboratory," was to be set up this year in Budapest, in which new designs and building methods will be tested year by year.\*

A housing development now being built in the Karlin district of Prague is similarly to serve as a pilot project for buildings which will then be copied elsewhere in the city after 1963. The structures will be assembled from giant four-ton precast panels; the apartment interiors are divided by wall panels which can be shifted to alter the size and number of rooms.

## Private Enterprise

HOWEVER DOCTRINAIRE the economic ideology and intentions of the particular Communist regimes, implementation of the housing program throughout the bloc is heavily dependent on private financing with State help in the form of credits and loans. Even in Czechoslovakia, the most advanced of the countries in the move toward total Communism, there is a surprising amount of private house building.\* In Bulgaria, the State Bank grants loans of up to 40,000 leva with a 25-year mortgage and annual in-

\* Of 1.2 million housing units scheduled for 1959-1970, 474,000 will be built by the State, 373,000 by cooperatives, 70,000 by kolkhozes, and 283,000 privately, with State aid. (*Prace* [Prague], March 8, 1959.)

"Is it so much colder at that height?"

"Heavens, no. The thing is that before he gets all the way up there he's got water sloshing in his shoes."

"What water? From where?"

"From the pail."

"Mr. Theo, please express yourself more plainly."

"I'm speaking Polish, ain't I? Water from the pail sloshes into his shoes. Before he gets them two buckets o' water up to that there tenth floor of his, he's swimmin' in his shoes."

"I really don't understand. You mean there are no faucets up there?"

"Sure there are faucets there, and water, too, but mostly only late at night. Usually it only comes up to the fourth floor, or even lower. And then Fijolek goes around sniffin' and shiverin'. But to my mind, he still ain't got the right to blaspheme his skyscraper, 'cause on Rybna Street he had to carry water too, from the courtyard. And if he's such a delicate French poodle why don't he wear two pairs o' woolen socks and eat aspirin before goin' to bed. The building's sound and I myself am goin' to vote for it in that there contest for the Best 1960 Warsaw Building. You with me?"

"Well, yes, but after they make those few small improvements."

"What improvements?"

"That elevator, and the water. . . ."

"My dear sir, we can't be askin' too much. The architecture, and the cubed balconies, and plaster that don't chip off, and elevators that run and water flowing out of faucets just any old time you want it. . . . Ain't it that maybe our heads are getting turned a little?"

terest of two percent to would-be home builders who will supply at least 30 percent of the cost of building out of personal savings. The Gomulka regime also encourages private house building through a combination of private savings and State funds. While State construction is to remain dominant in the field, a government bill in May 1957 "excluded from the public housing economy"—i.e., relegated to private enterprise—single family houses and apartments. The Fifth Polish Party Plenum (June 1960) revisions in the draft of the Second Five Year Plan cut the State funds allotted to housing by some 15 billion *zloty*. Party leader Gomulka said that the reduction in State investment would have to be made up by increased private investment through housing cooperatives, and maintained that it did not mean a reduction in the planned number of apartments to be built. (Nevertheless, this revision was taken as a retreat from originally announced housing goals and was vigorously protested in the Polish press.)

In 1958 and 1959, about one-third of the new housing in Hungary was financed entirely out of private funds, and another 40 percent out of private or cooperative means with some State credits. Only 25 percent was entirely State-

financed. Under the 15-year housing plan the State share is to be substantially enlarged and private home-building to be reduced to a maximum of 40 percent.

Some private house building is done by small craftsmen and contractors (this is illegal in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia), but the bulk of it is done by the individual families themselves, working after hours and on weekends. The houses become their own property, with full rights of bequest. (Last year the Bulgarian regime found it necessary to squelch a widely circulating rumor that the right of bequest of houses built with State loans was to be revoked in a forthcoming constitutional amendment. Zhivkov made an official pronouncement that the forthcoming amendment would "clearly and unequivocally guarantee to the citizen and his descendants that the dwelling built with his own income and labor is his private property.")

In Romania, State-assisted private house building is negligible even in comparison with the small amount of State building and especially compared with private home building without State credits. From the limited published information on privately built houses, it appears that most of these are small dwellings built by peasants in the rural districts.

Not only the savings but the labor of the ordinary citizens are being drawn on by the State, and not only for private but also for public building projects. In Hungary, "voluntary" labor pledges by the population for development of towns and villages reportedly amounted to 115 million *forint* in value in 1959. (The new trade fair grounds in Budapest is being built largely by these voluntary work brigades). The "voluntariness" of this sort of labor was questioned in *Belpolitikai Szemle* (Budapest), October 1959, which warned local administrations against "throwing unlawful obligations" on the population.



Modern interior of a new cafe-bar in Warsaw. Cafes, shops and all consumer services are still far too few in East European cities.

Stolica (Warsaw), October 30, 1960

## Architectural Design

IDEALLY the Communists would like to see arise a wholly new architecture which would be as quintessential an expression of the "new"—the Communist—age as was, for example, the Gothic architecture of medieval Christian Europe. The Communist leaders do claim rather imprecisely that a "Socialist" architecture is evolving on "a completely different, qualitatively new level . . . with its own style and forms which correspond to the profoundly democratic essence of the new society".<sup>9</sup> In fact, the term "Socialist realism" in architecture has come to be irrevocably associated with the now-discredited Soviet "wedding-cake" architecture of the Stalinist decade. This wave of Soviet architecture which engulfed the East European capitals in the 1950's has now receded, leaving behind a few stranded hulks such as the Palace of Science and Culture in Warsaw.\* The layout and effect of these buildings and complexes were uniform renditions of the Moscow model: heavy, ornate buildings accommodating government ministries, Army headquarters, Party press and radio, etc., were massed in the city center around a large open paved square designed for "popular mass demonstrations," and embellished with monumental sculpture, pillars and friezes. These city centers were to be the core of a general reconstruction of the entire city in the same manner; today, however, most of them stand isolated in the middle of rundown neighborhoods.

### "The Age of Cheops"

The building of such "imperial facades" in cities in which war ruins still gaped and general economic hardship prevailed was a conspicuous case of Stalinist perversion. The leading voice of the "thaw" in Poland, the short-lived student weekly *Po Prostu*, April 8, 1956, inveighed against the hypocrisy and extravagance of this kind of building:

"Certain architectural circles have apparently been mesmerized by the vision of a beautiful Warsaw, [in which] Marszalkowska Street is to be the capital's necklace with a huge jewel [the Palace of Science and Culture] set in its center. The architects of this decade forced and are still forcing through the construction of architectural geegaws for the sole purpose of impressing visiting strangers. That is why observers are wont to make the brutal comparison with the Age of Cheops. Because ordinary travellers, prying into the secrets of our mermaid [the emblem of Warsaw], can readily see that before there can be any thought of beads and other ornaments, she must first be given a hot bath and a delousing. . . ."

The paper recommended a tour through some of the Warsaw suburbs in order to gain an idea of the price that had been paid for the "geegaws." As a further example of wastefulness in architecture, *Po Prostu* cited a plan for commissioning sculpture for the new Tenth Anniversary

Stadium. It pointed out that the sculpture on the cornice of a new apartment on Piekna Street, scarcely visible from the street, cost one million zloty, for which all the apartments in the housing block could have been equipped with refrigerators. *Po Prostu* concluded that "our national disease of living beyond our means is being spread like bacteria by some of the, unfortunately, most prominent architects of this decade."

This kind of costly, oversized, overbearing architecture is no longer being built in Eastern Europe. The new buildings follow in the main the contemporary style current in the West—simple in line and light in scale, with the use of such devices as pastel-colored balconies to relieve the severity. It is in otherwise highly conservative Bulgaria that modern design finds its most extreme expression in Eastern European architecture. Particularly in the new Black Sea resorts, where the architects were given a relatively free hand, the architecture of the hotels, beach pavilions, and casinos is as streamlined and exuberant as anything in the West, and the Bulgarian regime is proud of it. At the town planning plenum in 1959, Party chief Zhivkov called the building at the new resort of Golden Sands "a bold, beautiful and yet economical architectural solution" and approved an award for its designers. About the twin resort development of "Sunny Shores," however, he had certain reservations, namely, that the resort is laid out in so extravagant a fashion that "one servant is required for every two guests."

"People who have been there are said to be pleased with it. It would be surprising if they were not," remarked Zhivkov drily. "If every individual had been offered a separate villa he would have been even better pleased. The question, however, is whether this is advantageous for the State. No, economically this is not advantageous."

"Face" is still a function of Communist architecture: "Under present conditions . . . our planners have a valuable contribution to make to the transformation of our country. . . . They must create the new face of our towns and villages which . . . will increase the national pride of every Bulgarian and capture the attention of the foreigner." But esthetic effect in architecture is now conceived in somewhat different terms. What is now stressed, instead of the visual impact of individual buildings, is the overall pattern of the city, the composition of groups of buildings, and the relation of the whole to the surrounding terrain. This possibility which the Communists claim as the unique advantage of their unhampered civic power, is held out as the answer to fears that increased standardization of building design will lead to monotony and drabness.<sup>10</sup>

#### SOURCES FOR THIS ARTICLE

- <sup>1</sup> *PRAVDA* (Moscow), June 8, 1960.
- <sup>2</sup> *RABOTNICHESKO DELO* (Sofia), November 3, 1959.
- <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>4</sup> *ZYCIE WARSZAWY* (Warsaw), March 26, 1959.
- <sup>5</sup> *ZEMEDEL'SKE NOVINY* (Prague), July 22, 1958.
- <sup>6</sup> *RABOTNICHESKO DELO* (Sofia), October 27, 1959.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, November 3, 1959.
- <sup>8</sup> *NEPSZAVA* (Budapest), May 4, 1960.
- <sup>9</sup> *RABOTNICHESKO DELO* (Sofia), November 3, 1959.
- <sup>10</sup> *PRAVDA* (Moscow), June 8, 1960.

\* Also the Communist Party headquarters building in Sofia, the *Scintelia* (Party newspaper) building in Bucharest, and the statue of Stalin in Prague. The "de-Stalinization" of buildings cannot be put into effect as rapidly as in more malleable aspects of life.

# Eastern Europe at the UN

*This department is devoted to a running chronology of the more significant activities and statements of the Soviet bloc representatives at the United Nations.*

**November 9** Speaking in the UN Trusteeship Committee, the Bulgarian delegate complained that the Western powers were not exerting enough pressure on Spain and Portugal to grant independence to nations in their overseas territories. The Polish delegate contended that the Assembly must take "an unequivocal decision" with regard to "colonialism under all its guises." And the Czechoslovak delegate insisted that the Committee "must demand from the administering powers transmission of information on political conditions in the territories." Only in this way, he said, could the Committee rightly assess how the principles of self-determination were applied. The Czechoslovak delegate asked the Committee to "force" Portugal and Spain to recognize their overseas territories as "non-self-governing" ones which then would fall under UN trusteeship jurisdiction. (In the course of the debate, US Senator Wayne Morse said that Spain and Portugal might unilaterally define what was meant by a "territory" but that it was still a UN duty to pass judgment on nations taking such a course.)

**November 10** Under the pretext of helping the UN out of its financial difficulties, Hungary's Tibor Keszthelyi proposed to the Budgetary Committee that the UN terminate Sir Leslie Munro's mission as the General Assembly's Special Representative on the Hungarian question. (Sir Leslie was appointed in 1957, after the UN issued a number of resolutions condemning the USSR and the Kadar regime for their role in the 1956 Revolt.) Hungary owes the UN \$718,215 in membership dues and in assessed contributions for the UN military force at Gaza.

**November 17** "Professor Imre Szabo of Hungary has been elected Vice President of the Administrative Committee of the UNESCO General Assembly. This is the first time that the principle of 'three officials' has been put into effect in a UN body. UNESCO now has three Vice Presidents—one from the NATO powers, one from the Socialist countries, and one from the uncommitted or neutral countries. This corresponds with the proposal presented by Mr. Khrushchev to the UN General Assembly concerning the office of the UN Secretary-General." (Radio Budapest.)

**November 18** Poland submitted to the Political Committee a draft resolution calling for the establishment of a committee to prepare a report on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, particularly their effect on human life and health. Deputy Foreign Minister Jozef Winiewicz also spoke in favor of the Polish draft resolution on banning nuclear weapons tests. In the course of his speech to the Committee, Winiewicz hit out against foreign bases,

calling them "a most aggravating element of the international situation," and emphasizing that "their existence increased the possibility of war because of incorrect assessments of the intentions of the other side."

**November 21** In the General Assembly debate on whether or not to seat the UN Congo delegation headed by President Joseph Kasavubu, Jiri Nosek of Czechoslovakia and Milko Tarabanov of Bulgaria attacked the US as a "colonial power." The Communist delegates maintained that Kasavubu had left his country "unlawfully" and had no legal power to represent his nation, and that Hammarskjold's policies in the Congo "thoroughly shattered the prestige of the organization." The Secretary-General, they maintained, had "openly sided" with the "Belgian and American colonialists." Jozef Winiewicz of Poland made a similar statement, asserting that Kasavubu had "purely ceremonial or formal functions" and therefore could not act without the approval of the Congolese parliament.

UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold informed the Budgetary Committee that the UN would soon cease to be solvent unless member nations paid their assessed dues and special contributions. He also stated that unless he was provided with an initial \$20 million fund, he would be obliged to take steps toward liquidating the military and civilian operation in the Congo. Although the Secretary-General did not name financial delinquents, a recent report issued by his Secretariat showed that the Soviet bloc owed \$17 million in membership dues and payments to sustain the UN Emergency Force in Palestine. The Communist bloc countries have refused to pay anything towards the Congo operations, declaring that the UN mission is a "US weapon" to reimpose "colonialism" in the Congo.

**November 22** The USSR and the Soviet bloc nations were among the countries which opposed seating President Joseph Kasavubu's delegation from the Congo.

**November 28** In the General Assembly discussion on the question of colonialism, the Czechoslovak delegate Jiri Nosek complained about attempts to "drag" Asian and African countries into aggressive military blocs. Nosek also spoke about the "dangerous aspirations" of West Germany which, he said, wanted to regain its former "imperial position" in Africa by economic penetration of the African continent. In reply to the British delegate's mention of Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe, Nosek objected to "slandorous" attacks on the Socialist States "for the purpose of diverting the Assembly's attention from colonialism."

*(Continued on page 33)*

## "Notes"

The rumored dismissal of Mieczysław F. Rakowski, editor of the Warsaw weekly *Polityka*, has now been tacitly confirmed by the removal of his name from the masthead (see *Current Developments*). The article for which *Polityka* received its severest criticism under Rakowski was Jerzy Andrzejewski's "Notes." Andrzejewski is one of the most popular of contemporary Polish writers; he is the author of the book from which the well-known film "Ashes and Diamonds" was made. After October 1956 he renounced his Communist Party membership.


Below are excerpts from "Notes": they appeared in the issues of October 1 and 22, 1960.

### THURSDAY

Many of those who approach the sphere of creative experiments and research with contemptuous disdain and even political suspicion, are attempting to discredit these efforts, as well as their results, by proclaiming in their stead the need for art understandable to the wide masses. Contemporary art for the masses? Of course, it would be no less than stupid to underestimate such a need. Not only good literature, but good music as well, are necessary. But has it entered anyone's mind that in the name of industrializing our country we should liquidate the workrooms and laboratories of our scientists? A recent issue of *Ruch Muzyczny* quoted the intelligent formulation of the Italian composer Luigi Dallapiccola: "If it were ever necessary to declare one day the existence of only one general tendency, instead of many varied tendencies, then that day would mean the end of art." Also it seems that a country where there is no artistic experiment today will tomorrow be able to popularize only its day-before-yesterday.

### SATURDAY

Spent yesterday evening at Zwyciestwo [Victory] Square to see a rally organized by the Warsaw Committee for the Cooperation of Youth Organizations. Already at six, young people, mostly young college students, had begun converging on the square from various parts of the city, and when the rally began the entire square was filled with a crowd of almost 100,000. As a *Sztandar Młodych* reporter correctly wrote the next day, "the platform—made of automobiles and girdled by a ring of flaming torches—was occupied by representatives of the KW PZPR, and the KC



"The institution's table of organization has been confirmed. However, there still remains the problem: what are to be its functions?"

*Polityka* (Warsaw), October 22, 1960

and KW of the ZMS, ZSP and ZHP" [Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (Communist) and the Central and Warsaw Committees of the Union of Socialist Youth, the Union of Polish Students and the Union of Polish Scouts]. I can imagine that from the platform the Warsaw youth rally, organized under the slogan Friendship and Peace, must have appeared very imposing: one hundred thousand young girls and boys, flaming torches, banners, posters, all in the shadows of falling evening adding, as it did, to the solemnity of the occasion. However, I was not on the platform but in the square, and just like most of the other participants I did not hear the speeches because the square had not been wired for sound, or maybe it was, but none of the microphones were functioning, except one, near the platform.

I circled the entire square. The platform looked very nice in the torchlight, but after a very few minutes no one was at all interested in what was happening on it. If, from immediately beneath the platform, from the small group who heard, there came a shout, it was indeed picked up by the rest—on the "pass-it-on" principle. The *Sztandar Młodych* reporter wrote the next day that "the resolution by the ZMS representative was greeted by a tremendous ovation." Perhaps it actually did seem that way from the platform. In the square I noticed no enthusiasm, for what was there to be enthusiastic about, if no one heard anything? What I did notice, however, was that most of the more sensible youngsters began dispersing even before the end of the rally. Their places were soon filled by what appeared to be the entire hooligan population of our city. But those who remained, especially the younger ones, left nothing to be desired in the way of busy-beaver activity.

Long snake lines of boisterous youngsters stabbing the crowd with sudden flying wedges were among the most innocuous of the activities. Also small groups forming dancing circles to warm up and kill the boredom. But after a while things improved, first the lighted torches began flying through the air, then they were used to frighten the girls and then there was much screaming, everybody seethed and yelled (only the microphones were silent). My son, a student in the eleventh grade, told me that boys from his school surrounded their girl friends in a tight circle and, protecting them in this way, tried to extricate themselves from the surging crowd; my daughter (eighth grade) got away with only her hat knocked off, her girl friend did not fare as well: she lost her school emblem—cut off with a razor blade together with a piece of her coat.

Towards the end of the rally I moved closer to the platform. There, everything was in exemplary order: scouts, orchestras, lots of militiamen.

In order to avoid any possible misunderstandings: I do not think badly of our youth. I think our youth is wonderful. I think badly of the rally organizers. I read the text of yesterday's pledge in today's papers.

#### SUNDAY

I received great satisfaction from the news in today's press that the Supreme Court rejected a revision of the verdict of acquittal handed down at the trial of Professor Tarwid—accused of murdering his wife—thus, by the same token, ruling on the permanence of the verdict. "This case," states the Supreme Court decision, "is full of doubts and indistinct situations. In accordance with the principle that the accused is considered innocent until proven guilty, all unresolved doubts must be interpreted in favor of the accused." It is rare that the stiffly formal judicial decision of a verdict has such wise and far-reaching humanist meaning. My utmost admiration for the people who prepared it.

At the time, I followed Professor Tarwid's trial very carefully and it was probably more than apparent even to the layman who knew nothing except what he read in the press that the trial was full of unclear situations, unspoken facts and even festering personal feelings. I was amazed by the people who, with such light hearts and sometimes even with the fanaticism of cruel satisfaction, so irrevocably adjudged the accused guilty of the crime. It seems to me at times that there exists a species of humans whose desire to degrade another human being is as strong as their need for the air they breathe. Normally stifled, these shameful desires bloom only in such situations, in the shade of the law, as it were, when they can satisfy their blood-thirsty criminality under cover of appeals for justice. Perhaps I am exaggerating, but whenever I hear voices demanding the death penalty—I also hear within them the need for crime.

#### TUESDAY


Before going to sleep I amused myself by estimating the royalties which would be paid certain contemporary writers if they happened to be Poles. Thus, old Thomas Mann would get 90 thousand *zloty* for his "Doctor Faustus"

(three years of work!), which means 2.5 thousand a month, Kafka would get 27 thousand for his "Trial"; Camus 10 thousand each for "The Fall" and "The Stranger" and Hemingway only 8 thousand for his "Old Man and the Sea." I assumed, of course, that all the above mentioned writers would be paid the highest rates provided for by our convention, that is, 2.5 thousand *zloty* per printing sheet. I wasn't really worried about Hemingway. Polish Film would undoubtedly approach him with a proposition to buy the motion picture rights to his "Old Man" and in such a case the Polish-writing Hemingway would get another thousand *zloty*—the price paid in Poland for film rights to a novel.

After making all these estimates, I slept very well: soundly and without any unnecessary dreams.

#### WEDNESDAY

I don't especially like efforts attempting to determine who among prominent people is the "most." But, if I were ever asked who among the creators of the first half of the Twentieth Century is the greatest, my answer—without hesitation and with all due respect to Proust, Thomas Mann, Eisenstein, Picasso or Stravinsky—would be: Charlie Chaplin. He alone, in our time, was successful in combining mental and artistic creativity with universality in the best and noblest meaning of the word. He created a character which has become a legend and belongs to millions, perhaps even more so than Don Quixote, Robin-



"Unique, unique, unique, unique. . . ."

Polityka (Warsaw), October 1, 1960

son Crusoe, Gulliver or Alice in Wonderland. It is not even the genius that I admire in Chaplin. I admire the completely unusual character of his genius which probably can be compared only with that possessed by Shakespeare. Chaplin appeals to all: children and oldsters, simple and even primitive people, as well as refined intellectuals. Everyone will find in him something for himself and to his own measure. He stirs and awakens a thousand thoughts and no fewer feelings. He is easily understood and highly complicated. He elicits laughter and tears. He is capable of approaching matters of the highest order by way of simple and frequently even banal affairs of everyday life. But actually, from his first short reels all the way to "Limelight," he dealt with only one problem: the adventures of the average man who wants to attune himself to life and in the process suffers many disappointments and even defeats.

In one of Chaplin's earlier films, "Soldier Charlie," there is a scene in which Chaplin, having finished guard duty, returns in a driving rain to his dugout in the trenches. Before entering he cleans his muddy boots with meticulous care (the need for order and systematic accuracy plays an

important part in all his films), after which, satisfied with a job well done, he takes a manly step forward and falls up to his neck in water which has flooded his dugout during his absence. The entire Chaplin drama in a nutshell. In Chaplin's world everything is animated and endowed with the ability to act: shoe laces, furniture, trees, machines, the world becomes a huge, raging jungle in which the lost man hopelessly gropes for peace. In the same "Soldier Charlie," Chaplin, being chased by German soldiers, hides in a ruined country house. He runs upstairs and, dashing into the first room, his first impulse is to close the door behind him. He does not notice that of the whole erstwhile protective barrier that was once a wall, nothing remains but the door. This scene (and so many similar ones in other Chaplin films!), when viewed for the first time, struck me as terribly funny. When I saw it the second time I still laughed, but my laughter was not as care-free as before, and the third time all I could do was remember Horodniczy's words: "What are you laughing at? You're laughing at yourself!"

*(Translated by Ewa Markowska)*

## Facts and Figures

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### Family Budgets in Poland

ONE OF COMMUNISM'S SMALLER ironies is that the Workers' State pays surprisingly little heed to how the workers actually live. In the West, a long history of radicalism and social protest has given rise to a complex art of social statistics; most governments publish elaborate figures on wages, living costs and family expenditures. But in the Soviet bloc such research is not encouraged, and the few studies that are made are seldom published in full detail. A partial exception to this is Poland, where in recent years there has been a vogue for polls, questionnaires and sociological studies of various sorts. While other Communist countries often publish figures for average earnings of

workers, usually in order to show that they have risen since capitalism was abolished, the Poles have gone behind the arithmetic veil and revealed how many workers earn less than the average.

Even the Poles have not been entirely candid in their discussions of workers' budgets, probably because large numbers of workers seem to have expenditures that exceed their legitimate sources of income. During the early 1950s, industrial development was carried to the point where living standards fell and it became almost impossible for the average worker's family to live on its income from wages. People began to steal from the State enterprises where they

worked, and an increasing (and unmeasurable) proportion of the national income was derived from the black market. While Gomulka has managed to raise average earnings by around 30 percent since 1956, it is generally recognized that he has made little headway against the traffic in stolen goods. For this reason, a survey of Polish workers' budgets leads to the impossible conclusion that many families earn less than enough to sustain life.

The Warsaw monthly *Przegląd Związkowy* (The Trade Union Review) published an article in September summarizing the results of a survey made in 1958 by the government's Main Bureau of Statistics. The government statisticians studied 3,000 families of industrial workers. More than one third of the families had two or more members working. The average family's income was derived from a number of sources: the main job of the head of the household (63.1%); the job of another family member (19.9%); social benefits, including family allowances, pensions, etc. (8.3%); secondary jobs (1.9%); and other sources such as a small farm or garden, the rental of apartment space, etc. (6.6%).

The average income per person in these 3,000 families was said to be 872 *zloty* per month, a sum which the author of the article evidently considered to be low. "We know that an income of 1,000 *zloty* a month per capita in a four-member household is considered relatively good in terms of prices and the cost of living. However, this same 1,000 a month is a rather modest income in a one-member household." However, in the group of families with more than 1,000 *zloty* income per capita, most had fewer than four members. About 21 percent of the families had a per capita income of less than 600 *zloty*, and more than 65 percent had less than 1,000.

What this means in everyday terms can be seen below. The average family spent almost half its income on food, a fact which testifies in itself to a very low standard of liv-

#### INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY SIZE OF FAMILY

| Number in Household | Percent of Families | Percent of households with per capita income of: |         |         |          |           |           |
|---------------------|---------------------|--|---------|---------|----------|-----------|-----------|
|                     |                     | up to 400 zl.                                    | 400-600 | 601-800 | 801-1000 | 1000-1500 | over 1500 |
| One                 | 12.6                | —  | —       | 0.1     | 0.8      | 5.0       | 6.7       |
| Two                 | 17.9                | —  | 0.6     | 3.1     | 4.4      | 6.8       | 3.0       |
| Three               | 23.0                | 0.1  | 2.0     | 5.6     | 6.0      | 8.2       | 1.1       |
| Four                | 22.5                | 0.2  | 5.1     | 9.0     | 5.4      | 2.7       | 0.1       |
| Five                | 14.6                | 0.5  | 6.3     | 5.0     | 1.8      | 1.0       | —         |
| Six or more         | 9.4                 | 1.4  | 4.9     | 2.4     | 0.5      | 0.2       | —         |
| Average             | 100.0               | 2.2  | 18.9    | 25.2    | 18.9     | 23.9      | 10.9      |

ing. The 21 percent of the families with a per capita income of less than 600 *zloty* a month spent well over half of it on food.

These figures, unfortunately, do not tell the whole story because they apply only to industrial workers. In 1958 the average wage in industry was above the average for the country as a whole. According to other Polish government figures, the average wage for all employees in 1958 was 1,499 *zloty* per month. Those in industry earned 1,667 and in construction 1,772. Wages in other sectors averaged as follows: transportation and communication, 1,484; municipal economy, 1,440; administration, 1,426; internal trade, 1,249; social and cultural institutions (including teachers), 1,216; agriculture and forestry, 1,071. (*Rocznik Statystyczny 1959.*)

The survey of industrial workers indicated that 63.1 percent of the average family's income came from the main job of the head of the household. In order to obtain the "relatively good" income of 1,000 *zloty* a month per family member, the head of the average household should earn at least 2,145.40 *zloty* monthly. In September 1958 more than 80 percent of all wage earners in Poland earned less than this amount, according to the government's statistical yearbook cited above.

#### EXPENDITURES BY INCOME GROUP

| Items Bought               | All Households | Expenditures of households with per capita income of: |         |         |          |           |           |
|----------------------------|----------------|---|---------|---------|----------|-----------|-----------|
|                            |                | up to 400 zl.   | 401-600 | 601-800 | 801-1000 | 1001-1500 | over 1500 |
| Total                      | 100.0%         | 100.0%  | 100.0%  | 100.0%  | 100.0%   | 100.0%    | 100.0%    |
| Food                       | 46.4           | 58.3  | 53.9    | 49.9    | 45.9     | 42.3      | 35.5      |
| Clothing                   | 18.0           | 13.1  | 15.7    | 17.3    | 18.1     | 19.3      | 20.5      |
| Housing                    | 6.3            | 3.8   | 4.8     | 5.5     | 7.2      | 6.7       | 8.1       |
| Fuel and light             | 2.5            | 3.0   | 3.0     | 2.8     | 2.7      | 2.2       | 1.6       |
| Health and hygiene         | 3.1            | 2.5   | 2.8     | 3.3     | 3.2      | 3.3       | 3.1       |
| Culture and education      | 4.3            | 2.5   | 2.8     | 3.6     | 3.9      | 5.9       | 5.9       |
| Alcohol and tobacco        | 4.1            | 3.4   | 3.5     | 3.8     | 3.9      | 4.3       | 5.1       |
| Communications and transp. | 1.5            | 1.0   | 1.2     | 1.3     | 1.5      | 1.6       | 2.2       |
| Other expenses*            | 13.8           | 12.4  | 12.3    | 12.5    | 13.6     | 14.4      | 18.0      |

\* Income taxes, organization dues, loan payments, savings deposits, etc.

# Correspondents Inside

## How Poles Become Millionaires

*"There are tens of thousands of people in this poor country who earn two or three thousand zloty, but own villas which cost almost one million."*

*A report by Warsaw correspondent Hansjakob Stehle in the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, November 26, 1960.*

WARSAW, NOVEMBER. Hundreds of thousands of Poles have been shocked by the announcement of a double tariff which will, in the future, discriminate sharply between gift parcels for personal use and goods sold commercially. The shock was felt by people like the Warsaw private businessman in whose shop window one can admire Italian ties, priced at 200 zloty [8 dollars]—although these artificial silk items carry a manufacturer's price tag of 450 lire [72 cents]. These new regulations hit all those Poles who make a profit on the parcels they receive from hundreds of thousands of their countrymen in the West and who, through these gifts, increase their meager earnings. Thousands of speculators are also affected—those who wish to become millionaires and those who already are. Even the Polish treasury will suffer a loss of tariff revenue when it ceases to obtain the profits from various quasi-legal manipulations.

It is considered taboo, in the Polish "economic miracle," to point out that the State, chronically short of foreign exchange, permits and even encourages its citizens to make transactions which run directly contrary to the principles of a State-planned economy and are therefore harmful to it. For the first time recently, the Party weekly *Polityka* touched upon this taboo in an ironic exposé that annoyed the Minister of Internal Trade. First of all, it put under a microscope the State commission stores—called "Comis" for short. In these stores any Pole can sell the contents of parcels received from abroad at an exchange rate three times the official tourist rate for zloty. The State then sells this merchandise, a wide assortment of Western goods, at a high profit: the net profit of only one of these "Comis" stores amounted last year to 15 million zloty. "Shameful from the ideological point of view," confesses *Polityka*. This situation has inspired some Poles to organize their own private foreign trade. There was the Polish airline pilot who, acting as an agent and for a nice commission, regu-

larly smuggled dollars to Paris (export of foreign currency is forbidden) and, in exchange, sent packages of woollens to various addresses. According to *Polityka*, this business works in the following way: one buys dollars on the black market at an exchange rate of 94 zloty to the dollar, smuggles this money to France, buys there, for example, a cheap woollen sweater for two dollars (188 zloty) which the Polish "Comis" then takes for 1,200 zloty. Customs duty up to now: 1,500 zloty for a package of 50 sweaters.

*Polityka* also did not overlook the grotesque situation existing in the gold trade. "If you, dear reader, come with some nice gold coins to *Jubiler*, one of the State Jewelry stores, we assure you that you will not be asked for any identification. The people there are polite. In the 'Comis' it is different: if, for instance, you bring them a doll from the German People's Republic, your birth date, your identification card and your automobile license plate number will be registered. At *Jubiler* you will only be politely greeted, for it is quite honorable to make money with gold." In a letter to the editors of *Polityka*, the Ministry of Internal Trade did not contradict this account but only corrected the calculation: The purchase price of gold was recently reduced from 154 to 135 zloty per gram. The State, which prohibits the illegal import of gold, nevertheless pays the smuggler, who is spared any questions, four times as much for the dollar as it itself established as the official exchange rate. The argument that, in this way, the State has the gold trade in hand, thereby drawing hidden treasures out of the mattresses and attracting the precious metal into the country, is contradicted by *Polityka*: "According to information given by the police, the illegal export of paper dollars is considered so great that the gold flowing into the *Jubiler* vaults is not worth half the amount." It is the State itself, however, which has made it rather difficult to combat the dollar blackmarket. "It is permitted in Poland to have foreign currency but not to trade it. Consequently, the law is only violated if foreign currency is transferred from one hand to another. But this takes only a brief moment," laments *Polityka*.

But why is the Polish State employing such semi-liberal methods? It must, in order to take advantage of the third source from which its badly paid citizens—and itself—feather their nests: the “Pekao.” A magic word to Polish ears! The state bank, PKO, has at its disposal a large stock of Western goods and Polish export goods which it sells to any Pole who receives foreign exchange money orders from the West or who is prepared to pay cash for his purchases with foreign currency. Trade is flourishing here too. The citizen who is blessed with an uncle in America becomes a State supplier: English instant coffee, French cognac, American nylon lingerie, hundreds of different goods are purchased by the State stores from dollar owners at an exchange rate which, quite officially, is only slightly lower than the black market rate. However, according to *Polityka*, those who want to be spared the bother and the red tape turn to helpful private agents: these agents buy PKO vouchers from everyone for *zloty* and charge an exorbitant commission. These gentlemen, of course, are thoroughly familiar with the State market. They know what the demands are or, if necessary, they “awaken” a need. Thus it happens that French champagne is available not only at the well-known “Delicatessy” but can also be found on dusty shelves in wretched suburban stores at the price of half a month’s salary. After all, the Party paper jeers, “managers are only human. . . .”

The example set by the State through its own manipulations naturally does not elevate the morals of the citizens. The road from the apparently legal, the semi-legal or even the twilight zone to the criminal, crosses a narrow border which is sometimes intentionally wiped out by all participants. Large and small scale corruption flourishes and undermines the structure of the planned economy. The “new class” of those who live in luxury consists pre-eminently, in contrast to other countries under Communist rule, of private, very non-political profiteers who take advantage of the semi-liberal economic methods. To live on normal wages is hard. Everybody knows, or assumes, that his neighbor, too, is involved as a matter of course in something shady. “However, it never occurs to anyone to report such impressions to the State’s attorney or the police,” the Party paper *Trybuna Ludu* complained recently.

### **Semi-Private Enterprise**

The closed or winking eyes assure those equipped with strong nerves that they may carry on their shady wholesale business. Mr. Galicki, for example, director of the State tanneries, shortly before he was to become Deputy Minister, received only a modest salary like all high officials, but for many years he has also had a splendid villa and his Mercedes. Like many others, among them his collaborators, he used to spend more money at evening vodka-drinking bouts than he earned in a month. Only years later did his income source become apparent: he would purchase leather of inferior quality from all over the country, put it into the State warehouses and then sell it to private shoemakers on the black market. The trial lasted two months and it was proved that Galicki and his “gang” had made a profit

### **THE WELL-WRAPPED PARCEL**

*The new customs duties imposed on gift parcels from abroad have had a heavy impact on the pockets of many Polish citizens. Those who are indigent can get the tax reduced, if they know how to go about it. The newspaper Zycie Warszawy, November 13, 1960, explained how:*

**QUESTION:** “What formalities are necessary to obtain this relief? I get parcels of used clothing from relatives in England, but the customs duty is determined by the customs office in Gdynia, while the local post office only collects the money. How can the customs office in Gdynia know to whom the relief applies?”

**ANSWER:** “In order to reduce the customs duties for used articles, the addressee should produce at the post office one of the following documents: (1) for pensioners, a coupon from a retirement check not older than two months; (2) for persons on public assistance, a certificate from the National Council. The document in question should be placed in a stamped envelope addressed to the customs office which has examined the parcel. The envelope must be given to the post office which has sent the notice of the arrival of the parcel. The post office sends the document to the customs office and, on the basis of this, the customs office recalculates the customs charge. After a certain time (practice will determine how long a time) all this gets back to your post office, which gives you the parcel upon payment of the lower duty.”

of 8 million *zloty*. The district attorney pathetically asked for the death sentence but the court, to everyone’s surprise, sentenced him to life imprisonment. This, to the displeasure of the Minister of Justice who had wanted to make an example of him.

Hardly had the sentence been passed, when news of another leather affair arrived from Kielce province. There the thieves, under salary to the State, had conducted their affairs unmolested for 10 years and had taken in 16 million *zloty*. In Krakow, a man was arrested after 15 years of profitable enterprise who, on the basis of the foreign currency trade, had founded a private credit institute and had lent hundreds of thousands of *zloty* at usurious interest rates. The manager of a Warsaw State store was found to have a deficit of ten thousand *zloty*. His defense counsel in court got him released after the missing money suddenly appeared. Who had laid out the money? The brother of the defendant who also was a branch manager of a State store. There are tens of thousands of people in this poor country who earn two or three thousand *zloty*, but own villas which cost almost one million.

Are these conditions the cause or the result of the confused economic situation in Poland? This is the prize question sadly pondered by learned Marxists. The temptation to cut through the vicious circle with a sword is great. Whoever governs a country on this basis and, moreover, as a Communist, is not to be envied.

# Men in the News

## Boleslaw Piasecki

THE POSTWAR activities of Poland's Boleslaw Piasecki, someone has said, are the only surviving instance of private political enterprise in the area between Vladivostok and the Elbe. The remark, though something of an exaggeration, does full justice to Piasecki's talents as a manipulator. In 1945, he bought his release from an NKVD prison by becoming head of Poland's "progressive Catholic movement," a lay organization committed to regime policies and founded to subvert the Church hierarchy by splitting the ranks of believers; by 1956, the movement—known for some years by the deceptive name of the PAX Association—had won few followers and many enemies, but Piasecki had considerably augmented his purchasing power. Within a short space of time, starting with control of the "religious" press, he had carved a small empire for himself which operated at an estimated annual profit of 100 million *zloty*.

In amassing a fortune, Piasecki hardly restricted himself to religious or pseudo-religious affairs; above all, he showed a genius for the mundane. Aside from controlling publishing firms PAX operated a bewildering variety of commercial and industrial enterprises. It owned its own factories, stores and warehouses, had a corner on the nation's construction industry, and peddled to the public a disconnected assortment of goods, ranging from fountain pens and tiles to complete one-family houses.

### *An Economic Czar*

With business booming, Piasecki lived like a tycoon. He owned a luxurious villa, rode around in a Jaguar, fattened on caviar and cognac, and went to sleep unperturbed by the problem of taxes. PAX didn't have to pay any. While some of its profits were used to subsidize its publications, none were spent on subsidizing the government; PAX enjoyed the unique position of being treated like a nationalized enterprise without losing the legal status of a private corporation.

The economic privileges of PAX, as well as Piasecki's prolonged adherence to Stalinism, came under severe criticism at the time of the October 1956 upheaval, and it seemed within the realm of bright possibility that he would be divested of his prerogatives. At one point, to stem the tide of public enmity, he went in heavily for donations, giving a large sum of money to advance the "cause of progress" in the Western Territories. Such maneuvers, however, probably were unnecessary, for he emerged unscathed. Today his position is as strong as ever: PAX representa-

tion is expected to increase in the coming parliamentary elections, and Piasecki himself may climb to new heights in the event of a further deterioration in relations between Poland's Catholic Church and the State.

Precisely how Piasecki managed to conquer a sector of the Polish economy is not known. Nor is the degree of political influence he wields. For some people in Poland, the explanation is that Piasecki became a Soviet agent after the Communist takeover in Poland, when he struck an advantageous bargain with the Russians, but this would not explain things in full. Perhaps more to the point is his shrewdness and inordinate personal ambition, of which financial success is only a minor part. Early in life, he displayed a thirst for political power, and although he has switched party allegiances more than once in his career, the vision of himself as a full-dress authoritarian leader is reputed to have remained untarnished by time.

### *From Fascism to Communism*

Born in 1915 to a middle class family in Cracow, Piasecki entered the arena of politics in his late teens, while specializing in the philosophy of law at Warsaw University; by the age of twenty, he had formed his own party, the "National Radical" group, *Falanga*, which shared a common philosophy with fascist parties in other parts of Europe. To people who knew him, he seemed eminently suited for the role of chieftain of a chauvinist-racist camp. He had, it was said, a mesmerizing Führer-like quality which particularly impressed women, and with his blond hair and blue eyes might have served as a Slavic prototype of the "Aryan man." Whatever sympathies he may have had for Nazism, Piasecki, probably for patriotic reasons, refused to collaborate with the Germans when they occupied Poland. He was arrested by the Gestapo toward the end of 1939, and remained in prison until 1940, when he was released on the personal intervention of Mussolini (who reportedly responded to pleas of Piasecki's friends in the Polish aristocracy and with whom he may have had close political ties).

When free, Piasecki joined the resistance. He changed the name of his party to National Confederation, and its partisan units, under his command, subsequently began operating in the eastern sector of Poland seized by the Russians in 1939 on the basis of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and invaded by the Germans in their 1941 offensive against the USSR. Piasecki's war record is a story of bravery marred by fanaticism: his forces not only wiped out Nazis but also

Soviet guerillas; in their spare time, it is said, they propagated the old *Falanga's* philosophy by liquidating Communists and Jews. In 1943, Piasecki's units were incorporated into Home Army ranks, and he ended the war as a battalion leader.

For his anti-Soviet activities, Piasecki faced the postwar period from the narrow confines of an NKVD death cell. According to Jozef Swiatlo, the former Polish Security colonel who escaped to the West in 1953, Piasecki there met his savior in the person of Ivan Serov, the NKVD plenipotentiary in Poland. One of Serov's many tasks was to undermine Poland's Catholic Church: finding no Catholic leader who would cooperate with him, he found an eager colleague in Boleslaw Piasecki, who distinguished himself by writing a memorandum to Soviet authorities expounding his views on Poland's new "situation." A number of personal interviews between Serov and Piasecki produced an agreement, and Piasecki took his place in Communist society as editor of the pro-regime "Catholic" weekly *Dzis i jutro*.

### ***The Will To Power***

His adamant endorsement of Stalinism in the years that followed antagonized Polish Communists and Catholics alike. Piasecki came into sharp conflict with the Church hierarchy, his writings were placed on the Index by the Vatican, and in the tumultuous days of October 1956 he aroused the hatred of pro-Gomulka Communists by opposing liberalization and warning that "irresponsible moves" would very likely "precipitate measures of a military nature for the brutal realization of the interests of the State." One Polish writer, Leopold Tyrmand, expressed his contempt for Piasecki in 1957, when, in the popular periodical *Swiat*, he analyzed Piasecki's postwar alliance with the Communist leaders:

"The Stalinist Party—as later became publicly manifest—granted Piasecki the right to the superstructure—to form an ideology of his own that would uphold the new situation, to preserve within this ideology elements dear to the heart of a Pole and of a totalitarian, indeed, even to retain certain Nietzschean characteristics of the elite, including the 'will to power.' It may be that the Stalinist Party held out to him the delusion of Poland's international importance in the new system, a delusion which enabled Piasecki to formulate his subsequent observations on the new role of the Polish State under conditions of surrendered sovereignty. As a *quid pro quo*, the Stalinist party undoubtedly demanded complete and unqualified approval of the basic principles and methods of its totalitarianism. . . . Piasecki could accept the methods without batting an eyelash, for it was a wonderful way to assure the masterly achievement of the single-party hegemony which he had dreamed of for


so long but had never attained. . . . Thereafter he stood at the disposition of the then Polish Ministry of State Security."

### ***Enigmas***

Despite all that is known about Piasecki, to most people he remains an enigma. Although he is a man with many enemies, he has a group of devoted admirers who maintain that in the postwar years he saved many non-Communist intellectuals from starvation by giving them jobs with PAX, whose employment conditions are superior to those of most enterprises in the country. In some quarters, Piasecki's ambitions are the target of bitter if uneasy jokes. Currently, he is rumored to be dreaming of replacing Cyrankiewicz which, to some people, represents a considerable modification of his original longings, since Gomulka still would be in his way. That his politics are shrewd, however, no one doubts. His staunch and unfailing support of Poland's "alliance" with the USSR is now standing him in good stead, and the expected decline of PAX's political rival, Znak, a Catholic parliamentary group formed in the post-October period with the unofficial support of the Church hierarchy, bodes well for his future.

Despite his success, Piasecki has not escaped bitter personal tragedy. In 1957, his sixteen-year-old son, Bogdan, was kidnapped in what remains one of the most mysterious crimes in Poland's postwar history. For months after the boy's disappearance, Piasecki sought information on his whereabouts. He offered a \$4,000 reward for apprehension of the criminals, and posters promised an additional 100,000 *zloty*, and later 300,000, for particulars of the abduction. Each edition of the PAX daily *Slowo Powszechne* carried the boy's photograph. Finally, on December 8, 1958, workers engaged in the reconstruction of a Warsaw house found the boy's body. He had been stabbed to death. A number of people in Poland explained the incident as an act of political vengeance, possibly in retaliation for Piasecki's war crimes. Others attributed it to simple hooliganism; to this day, nothing factual is known.

The mystery of Piasecki himself most likely will never be unravelled. As a crypto-fascist thriving in Communist society, the most that can be said is that he knows how to exploit as well as to be exploited, and that his achievements as a maverick probably have encouraged his tendency to harbor dreams of glory. However, there may well come a day when Piasecki will cease to be necessary to the regime, and he will feel the full impact of his alienation from the Communist world. In the meantime, however high his opportunism will enable him to rise, it is certain that to most people in Poland his name is symbolic of treachery and that, even to those men at the top who depend on him, he is, more often than not, an object of scorn. —M. S.



"FLOWER" (oil), by C. Kafka

*Plamen* (Prague), No. 10, 1960

*Flowers  
From The  
Graveyard*

Morbidity, necrophilia and baroque feelings in present-day Czechoslovak poetry.

by GEORGE KARNET

# **"SUDDENLY I UNDERSTAND A GREAT DEAL ABOUT FOUNTAINS THOSE INCOMPREHENSIBLE TREES MADE OF GLASS."**

Poets have their beloved words, painters their own colors, or, as Picasso, their color periods, playwrights and novelists their favorite situations and characters which they project from one novel to another. Thus Rainer Maria Rilke, who wrote the verse quoted above, had his favorite words "glass" and "tears." A reader might recognize from the use of these words alone that a line was by Rilke. Similarly, the word "cat" would make us think of a poem as Baudelaire's, the word "orchard" would remind us of Pasternak and so on. Poets do have their words and worlds and on the basis of certain complexes of images and metaphors we may identify whole poetical periods.

This method of analysis of recurring images we now want to apply to the poetry written in the last two years in Czechoslovakia. Up until the early Fifties all Czech poetry rhymed in unison words such as "malin" (raspberries), "kalin" (viburnum) and "rozvalin" (ruins). From morning till midnight all poets somehow heard the gay chatter of children, looked into gleaming eyes of their babies and read in them the promise of a wonderful future. When they walked in the fields they did not hear birds but rather the loud voices of the metal lungs of new tractors while in the sky there was no gossamer but the smoke of new factories; above this they saw Picasso's dove of peace.

No Czech poet today pays the slightest attention to raspberries, viburnum and ruins, not to mention tractors. Yet, it is striking to see the unanimity with which they now, freely and without compulsion, sing a new theme which is almost as monotonous as the previous songs of praise to Marshal Stalin. What is this new theme that so strongly captured the imagination of virtually all Czechoslovak poets? Let us start with a poem by Miroslav Florian called "From the Diary of Captain Nemo":

*"Heavy greens crowd my soul  
I'm full of sand, broken glass and mud of graveyards,  
a bee can fly through me without getting hurt  
it does not even lose its grain of pollen."*

Or a poem by Jan Pilar:

*"Something struggles in nature and in me,  
I hide a cold heart in my winter coat  
The earth is soft, the gravedigger tells me  
with a mystic gesture of Prince Hamlet  
Come, I'll dig a hole for you that will last years."*

The young poet Jiri Sotola, whose first book was titled "The Graveyard Tomb," wrote the following lines in his new poem, "The Cemetery Street":

*"And I will keep on rotting and turning into fine  
dust with fragrant ailing clod of the world under  
my head. . . ."*

Marie Pujmanova writes:

*"This is the country where by transplantation  
the cornea of the dead can see again. . . ."*

*Where the scientist x-rays dark spirits  
that used to roam around in shrouds."*

Jarmila Urbankova says in her poem "Let the Stone Speak": "On your knees you embraced the earth hollowed out by a new cemetery," and a similar tone sounds from Ladislav Stehlik's poem "To the Girls of Stalingrad":

*"Into your image I saw projected the woman  
sculptured over graves with silent gaze into steppe."*

Alena Vrbova calls at "This country of ours dreamed out by the dead" and goes on to write

*"And yet the grief did not pass away  
and yet the dead of war  
come to sit at our table  
and talk knowingly, gently  
as simply as if they were alive."*

And so it goes, verse after verse, poem after poem, poet after poet. With a monotonous certainty we find words like death, cemetery, burial, tombstone, gravedigger, Hamlet, shrouds, shins, skeletons, widows, decay, coffins, etc. And it is not only the poets we quoted at random—like Miroslav Florian who feels full of graveyard mud, or Jan Pilar who talks to a gravedigger and watches his own grave dug, or Otto Safranek who holds a necrologue over Death's coffin, or Jiri Sotola who dreams about his own process of moldering and rotting, or Alena Vrbova who sits down with the dead to take dinner. The baroque morbidity, the necrophilia of present-day Czechoslovak poetry is common, and it is difficult to find an author who does not spell it out one way or another. The image of death is evoked by virtually everything, even a simple shining bugle which Vlastimil Marsicek immediately associates with weddings and funerals:

*"I hear you as you lead me by hand along headlane  
unbridling shiny reins of the funeral  
making the horses' manes fly  
moaning so that that dead's heart aches  
to break the coffin and unyoke the piebald  
and take off high on it and fly over the clouds."*

His poem ends with this optimistic verse:

*"The great human song, like an orchard launched by  
Spring,  
my bugle, you must play on my way to the grave-  
yard."*

## **Lidice and Baby Carriages**

**D**EFENDERS OF Socialist realism might argue that the death-theme in Communist poetry will necessarily be played as long as the remaining half of the world has not experienced the full blessings of Socialism. It might be said

that to be captivated by morbid images is understandable, considering the war, the slaughters at Stalingrad and Lidice, the Nazi horrors—together with the fear of atomic danger and the recollection of Hiroshima. Some morbid images certainly are associated with such memories. Thus, when Karel Siktanc writes his "Lidice" we find the verses:

*"And Vaclav Kovarovsky, the gravedigger  
is useless by now, useless.  
Yesterday people ground the corn here  
and when a single one of them died  
they turned the mirror to the wall  
and stopped the clock."*

However, Siktanc goes on with almost Flaubert-like greedy obsession to register the minutest details of death and burial:

*"The dead are funny like clowns  
you can step on their feet  
you can knock off their eyeglasses  
the dead cannot defend themselves  
You can steal their ring  
monocle, cuff-links, medal, watch,  
pull the shoes from the smith's insteps  
and boots from the police. . . .  
Aged men have golden teeth  
and the dead feel no more pain  
tiny ashes snow down in black  
on white pallid corpses."*

But it is not just Lidice that provokes Siktanc's thoughts of death. He writes another poem called simply "Summer" and intones:

*"The plain is on fire and from the village walks a  
silent and black procession . . . the sun trembles on  
the cart with the coffin, long and gloomily whined  
the two horses that pulled her as if she were a bride."*

It is the same with other poets. Karel Kapoun writes:

*"Let us shed the big tear of the world  
for the yellow kids without bathing suits  
who played with the waves of the sea  
and got a bomb in this paradise  
like a spanking from grown-ups."*

However, the same author says, in "On the Way from Movies":

*"Let death grin down from the stars  
like a concave circular from sawdust,  
I laugh, too, almost with a toast to it."*

Most of the poets sound morbid and hard. With Kainar "the drunkards stagger from the bar as from a grave," "little flies circle their mene tekell," and his hero, Mr. Lazar, alias "Death," smells of carbolic acid and sees death and doom everywhere, even in a baby carriage:

*"Sweet baby, daisy, how I pity you,  
we all are carried in a different pram  
The one with blankets full of ash  
and eternal fire! Little eyes of yours, beautiful squirrel,  
rel,*

*do you know your look with tiny diamonds cuts a  
groove  
in the glass of purest frost of an absolute death!"*

Mr. Lazar also sees death in the characters of lovers:

*"Please, beautiful girl—  
we all do beg, don't we?  
Before we beg our way in eternal  
anguish for ever? — So long for now!  
The two get their heads spinning  
and smell phenol in their ice cream, in everything,  
finally in each other, in every single word of theirs."*

Death is omnipresent, and as Josef Kainar puts it: "Tragicalness to me is not a human prerogative. Even a hare looks tragical to me."

The theme of death in its more subtle, elegiac form we find in the elder generation of poets such as Marie Pujmanova, Jaroslav Bednar, Frantisek Gottlieb, Vilem Zavada, Jan Noha, Frantisek Branislav, Jan Alda, Milos Jirko and Oldrich Mikulasek. It appears to be a similarly weaker, less horrifying theme of anxiety with the youngest poets. In contrast, themes of death and necrophilia are most powerful in the middle generation of poets, now in their forties—like Jan Pilar, Ivo Fleischman, Josef Kainar, Jiri Sotola, Vlastimil Marsicek, Alena Vrbova and Karel Siktanc. This is the generation that seems to be most captivated by morbidity—regardless of their political affiliations.



"STREET" (oil), by Vaclav Bartovsky

Výtvarné Umeni (Prague), No. 8, 1958

## The Fish

THERE IS another symbol in Czech poetry which recurs with ever-increasing compulsion. It is the metaphor of "fish." It appears in the poetry of Vlastimil Marsicek whose "Fisherman sees a phosphorescent fish, sees a horrible fish, boneless fish," in Jiri Pistora's verses of the "Pleiades":

*"So in the end the rain frightens just the fish,  
say to me we are not a cloud—I'd have almost asked  
What is it that remains of man?"*

Alena Vrbova writes "You feel slightly sick in harbor from the meat of gutted fish," Jan Pilar says "To close oneself in a blue aquarium—with glass fish swimming on the walls" and a little further on he continues "face to face against endless emptiness—filling itself with fish."

Similarly, with Miroslav Holub we find such verses as

*"deep down below in cathedrals fish swim  
and each of us is called out by name."*

The fish symbol appears also in Karel Kapoun's and Miroslav Cervenka's poetry, the latter writing about "deepwater fish hooked on rod" and continuing:

*"Though I myself lie somewhere there like submerged stone  
with its corns of mica, lichens  
with its hope and dirt  
It washes, caresses, crushes, grinds me,  
my life and death are engraved in me."*

The symbol is also used by Ivo Fleischman, particularly in his "Sailors":

*"And below the deck the fish worked on their own decay . . .  
Hideous old crab like a misunderstanding  
like a fish that took the wrong way . . .  
And we on the deck like little angels stood  
and among us lay the old loathsome crab  
And over us so many days so many nights  
so many waves and fish, friendship and enmity . . .  
The fish down below in boxes, polite,  
a layer of salt, layer of fish, but I see  
a little fish by my large boots  
forgotten, a little tacit fish."*

When we read this poetry and feel as if in a fish market, it is hard to understand where all the fish comes from in a country which only Shakespeare saw as having a sea-coast. What is the meaning of this symbol? We cannot help thinking that the fish symbol is a symbol of death, of male death. After all, there is a similar meaning of the symbol in the biblical story of Jonah, as well as in Melville and in Hemingway's "The Old Man and the Sea." There

\* It must be apparent from the examples given that the fish symbol as currently employed has nothing to do with its early Christian use.

is also quite an explicit statement of this point in Vlastimil Marsicek's verses, whose Fisherman sees

*"a phosphorescent fish, fish of horror, boneless fish,  
monstrous fish, fish the death with fiery fin."*

A little later Marsicek asks "why does the fisherman see death in your fish," and he bares his meaning in the line:

*"fish the death, fish the dream, fish the thought."*

## Behind the Skull

WHAT REASONS LIE behind this deep skepticism, frustration and despair? We have already said that the preoccupation with death cannot be explained simply as the effect of the past national and human tragedies. It is clear that these poets have more intimate, concrete and recent reasons for their pessimism. Their poems aim at the present, contemporary world in which they live. The poets see its grayness well. Miroslav Cervenka writes:

*"The silent dejection of pavement. A beret  
drowned in concrete foundations of waterworks.  
Sobs under neon lights. Thresholds  
worn round by heels of generations  
that leave in the morning  
and in the evening tired wipe the soles  
from sand of foundries, soil of graveyards  
dust of crushed foliage from autumn alleys."*

Take personal relations—the lovers of Josef Kainar are "gray and shallow," while Karel Kapoun says

*"Lovers always frightened, shy,  
fear falls on them from everywhere."*

Frantisek Branislav—like his whole generation—yearns over the past and writes

*"Timid candles tremble on the graves  
there's nothing more moving  
Widows' eyes gaze from everywhere."*

Milos Jirko grieves that "there is so much gloom among people, so much gloom." Others are more specific and defend themselves against "corporals who pierced Archimedes," as does Miroslav Holub, or against generals, as does Jan Pilar:

*"With the key of human word open the rusty locks  
however they may creak. . . .  
But, you walk the earth with the step of a general."*

He also claims the need for non-conformism:

*"Even in the eclipse of the Earth there are  
irregularities  
over which astronomers rack their brains in vain. . . .  
Life cannot be dropped into test-tubes  
happiness cannot be weighed on beam-scales. . . .  
You will not force recognition  
by orders of grenadiers nor by flattering  
those higher up!  
Comrade Doc, I wish you just one single blunder  
you would make with pleasure, consciousness"*



"VELOCITY" (polyester and metal), by Jiri Novak

Výtvarné Umeni (Prague), No. 9, 1959

*of a soldier guard.  
Then there'd be joy here  
and all would sigh with relief  
that a man was born!"*

This, of course, is still far from the reality. "Inquisitors and Judases" still walk around, as Vlastimil Marsicek says, with "iceboxes of unlove on their shoulders" and among them, as Ivo Fleischman writes, there lies the "hideous old crab like a misunderstanding, like a fish that took the wrong way." Some, according to Holub, "shoot down pictures with rifles like paper roses."

M. Zavada refuses to see an escape in alcohol.

*"Is it only drunks who can carry the world  
when they get their shots at the bar?  
But how, how only move the Earth, how to move  
and lift a basketful of her?"*

Miroslav Florian in "Man at Sea" puts his individualism against the grayness of collective life:

*"That rolling gloomy herd  
that rubs against my boots  
how much would it like to shoot forth  
from its corrosive desolation."*

Similarly, although with some hesitation, the individuality of her generation is defended by Marie Vonakova:

*"We are of flesh and blood, not from a textbook  
we are not exemplary, calm and humble  
flawless  
In us we still have a bit of ancient ruse and treason  
sometimes we are cruel, stupid, stupid like the  
monkeys,  
but though we are of flesh and blood and not from  
textbooks  
something changes within us every day . . . every  
day."*

However, it seems that the feelings of despair have yet a deeper motivation than mere disappointment with life in Communism. It seems to me that the anxiety of poets, which evokes such a black morbidity, is in the last instance a metaphysical anxiety, fear of emptiness, consciousness of the inevitable end which will come like "the moldering of fish" and of which the generation in their forties is becoming more clearly aware. It also seems to me that the poets—particularly those who really believed in Communism—were for some time under the spell of an illusion that they were in a way immortal, since they would live on in the masses.

Now, however, the awareness of personal mortality runs through verse after verse. M. Kapoun thinks about his own death when asking "how could I die now?" and gets frightened about aging:

*"I am not dead My pallid Julie  
your love like a perfumed soap  
will wash me young, will stop my age . . .  
We won't grow old: we'll die suddenly  
we'll die after the longest kiss."*

The secondary theme of growing old we also find in Ivan Skala:

*"In a dim mirror I see your face,  
don't, don't believe it's aged gray  
Haven't you ever seen  
extinct fires smoke,  
glitter, gleam?"*

There is also the expected concept of the inevitable finality of human life. Vlastimil Marsicek writes:

*"On his heart he carried forty-two years . . .  
Forty-two years I plant the orchard  
forty-two long patient rows."*

Similarly, M. Florian says about his Prometheus:

*"He is timed for forty years,  
perhaps more, perhaps less"*

and goes on:

*"I walk frozen through and locked  
in a skin of mortal bones—  
Staggering among whirling stars  
quite neglectable  
solid point."*

Most contemporary Czechoslovak poets are agnostics. Thus Josef Kainar puts the face of death in place of the image of God. His "Mr. Lazar" "has lived and has not lived, has become sand to be sifted through a riddle, he is bare, just short of shaking a metal alms-box for its two altars of Nothingness in security, in service of voluntary temple workers, of the blessed secular agony." "And everything that is inhuman in men he has got arrayed in catalogue." Almost identical is the picture of St. Sebastian in Holub's poem where he "suffers, collects in alms-boxes for something that was not, is not and shall not be."

Otto Safranek is an agnostic who writes that "Nobody is said ever to get into the kingdom of heaven," but then he asks with anxiety: "What will come after?" Ivo Stuka likewise points to the insufficiency of a technological answer to the metaphysical problems of man:

*"Over the cold Moon  
one rocket paces  
in melancholy, I know,  
it is sad, lonesome."*

In Jan Noha's poem we find similar anxiety:

*"Eternity like a prisoner in a narrow cell  
would like to escape and looks for a savior!"*

Also Jiri Sotola, who ponders:

*"The world, maybe, is no one's, strange,  
someone has just timed it and thrown and  
it just hisses, hisses."*

Ivo Fleischman is horrified by the thought that the meaning of life is mere "struggle for life" and confesses how he felt when realizing that the Party, protecting him from the outside, cannot protect him from his own feelings of emptiness and his own final disintegration:

*"When I grasped in time how little time I had  
and found in time that no one controls,  
not even our captain, the pull of wind, the gale in  
clouds."*

Perhaps this feeling of emptiness and despair is best expressed in the "Song on the Sea" by the talented Miroslav Florian:

*"Those walls within which one cannot  
even open arms to make love,  
ship cabin pitched by wild gale  
where salty water rises fast  
and cannot be pumped out  
Terrific ascent, terrific fall  
Is this I?—And full of dread  
I carry dark heaven on my neck  
Humiliated and abased  
I am the sense of everything, a sparkle, dream  
And death that grinds me drunkenly  
itself dies with the death of mine."*

Where do the Czechoslovak poets see hope? There is very little of it and even that is shy. "The New Hour," which Vitezslav Nezval talked about in his poetry, is usually nameless. The poets only rarely think—as does Jiri Havel—that

*"Within reach of the stars we are,  
we overeaters of nebulae and fume."*

and ask with Fleischman

*"I asked the sailors when the keel will touch  
the star."*

People will not give the answer, as Pilar indicates:

*"So many words have been said,  
yet those you wait for do not come  
People keep them for themselves like oboli  
to have enough for Charon when the ship's been  
wrecked . . ."*

The poets wait in nostalgia like Marsicek:

*"The longing of the poet who looks out from the  
beach as years ago  
the longing of Ovid who waits for happy wind  
to bring along a ship—till he turns into stone."*

But there is nothing coming, and Jan Pilar writes:

*"Night after night I go from here all pierced with  
bullets  
to come back by day healed again."*

Some want to overcome their metaphysical nostalgia by a return to primitive vitalism. Jan Noha wants to believe that

*"Everything begins anew  
everything is yet to come  
I am living it through  
Not even the time has been such  
as will be from now on."*

And Marie Pujmanova hopes the anxiety will pass away:

*"the way the plague and hunger and smallpox ceased  
and blood revenge and burning of the widows . . ."*

Others, however, are aware of the fact that time itself does not solve our metaphysical problem; on the contrary, it makes its contours sharper. They are trying to find their certainty in newly brushed-up moral values. Vladimír Vlček sees a need for "an intimate freedom among people," Jan Pilar wants

*"to learn how to carry heaven  
to never falter under anyone's guilt  
to know how to carry greatness of the world,  
unfailing."*

Similarly, the young Karel Tomásek points out the need for

*"the song that trusts the dawn  
and sings, sings about a backbone  
that knows how not to bend."*

Jan Pilar continues his search:

*"I carried the weight of the world tied into a bundle  
Kept vigil into the grayness of the dawn  
Sought true answers in the looks of people."*

and sees the solution also in a restored respect for the life of the common man. Miroslav Holub, too, believes in the final victory of simple human feelings:

*"The little ones will overtake Achilles with golden  
greaves, lustrous and famous."*

Indeed, these classical references are a conscious attempt to overcome the intellectual shallowness of Stalinism and to continue in the common cultural heritage, thus seeking identity and security. This is clear in the verses of M. Florian:

*"The world is opening its mouth like Homer,  
twos and twos saunter into Troia  
and the Illiad starts again."*

Hand in hand with the attempt to restore the intellectual alliance with the cultural past of mankind goes a return to a cosmopolitan awareness of global totality. In Karel Kapoun's collection "Occupy All Stars" we read:

*"From heart circulation to world rotation he shifts  
his streaming blood  
just like a belt to a higher gear."*

and Vlastimil Marsíček writes how

*"the fisherman with his heart stamped visas  
into his future time in which all will join hands."*

Czech poets seek their new relationship with the world, its cultural values, with themselves, their hearts, their new feelings of anxiety and love, their new individualism. Miroslav Cervenka writes:

*"And I am playing with the heart  
testing what it will do  
I pace and stop the pendulum  
turning the clock hands so that  
early morning midnight may strike."*



"LOW TIDE AT LE FRET," by Jan Zrzavý

Výtvarné Umení (Prague), No. 3, 1960

Jan Pilar says in one of his latest poems:

*"At least a single squeaky verse  
you press on the pen of night  
Your Self will step forth again, inciting words  
resound,  
blinded newts will creep out  
on the slopes of the world."*

The most conscious individualism is found in Florian, who is one of the most articulate young poets:

*"For ages the sea rends its chest  
to hide in a tiny human tear  
And I carry it, lift all the time  
what threatens to be buried under its own weight  
Limping I stubbornly stamp upon  
the Earth full of naphtha to make it revolve,  
buzz, spin, clatter and thunder  
on its orbit."*

Elsewhere he says:

*"I go frozen through and locked  
into a skin of mortal bones  
but the verse I'm silent about  
knows of grace . . ."*

They all seem to see the solution in human unity, unity of the intellect. Writes Miroslav Holub:

*"Life is indivisible  
Wisdom is indivisible  
Meaning is indivisible."*

and talks about "an old man in a leather jacket, like the starlight that beams down for two hundred years," and in this image of a cosmic old man he returns—in a humanistic circle—to the perpetual human concept which the Czech poets had renounced but which they now seem to find to be the only answer to the nothingness of death and its metaphysical emptiness.

The Hungarian delegate to the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee insisted that a government be allowed to decide for itself what makes "good" or "damaging" news. The delegate, speaking in the course of a Committee discussion on article two of a draft Convention on Freedom of Information, opposed attempts to amend the draft article by listing in more concrete form the instances in which freedom of information can and should be limited. All the Soviet bloc speakers have been against a Philippine amendment which would have the proposed limitations "defined by law" and applied in accordance with it. On the other hand, the Bulgarian delegate defended a proposed Cuban amendment which would include among the list of limitations a reference to "expressions and information which are false and which create tensions in international relations, or relations between racial, national and religious groups."

**November 30** In the UN debate on colonialism, the Polish delegate Jozef Winiewicz supported the Soviet view that the year 1960 was the time to grant "independence in full" to all countries, including those under UN trusteeships, and the non-self-governing territories. In the course of his speech, Winiewicz referred to the fact that wherever colonialism existed, "there was merciless exploitation, human racial discrimination and denial of the fruits of civilization," and maintained that "colonialism could neither be reformed nor improved." Winiewicz included in his statement an attack on NATO and "Western military bases abroad," calling such bilateral agreements "neo-colonialism" which imposed dependence on countries with such bases. The Bulgarian delegate spoke in the same vein, hewing closely to the line set by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin.

**December 1** Romania and Peru clashed in the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee in a discussion on the question of freedom of information. The Romanian delegate contended that the aim of a Peruvian sponsored amendment was to "remove all obstacles for propaganda inciting to war and to national, racial and religious hatred." The Romanian delegate implied that its real purpose was to deprive the newly developing countries of mass communications and to keep them in the hands of "foreign powers" which would thus "impose their will on former colonial nations." The Peruvian delegate, visibly shaking, replied that the purpose of the amendment was to safeguard free expression and opinion against prior censorship and to protect freedom of information against the tyranny of the State.

The Political Committee concluded its debate on disarmament prior to arranging matters for a vote on 12 separate draft resolutions and one amendment. During the discussion, the Soviet bloc countries urged the Committee to take up on a priority basis a Polish draft centered around the nuclear test ban talks in Geneva. The resolution would have the General Assembly meet in special session if the USSR, the US and Great Britain fail to reach agreement by April 1, 1961. Romania and Poland contended that the

agreement hinges only on a "positive attitude" of the US and its allies. The Romanian delegate put the blame for the disarmament impasse on the US. Objections to the Polish draft centered on the demand for a nuclear test moratorium without a test-ban agreement, and a ban on military and missile bases on foreign territories, also without possibilities of inspection.

**December 2** In issuing his special report on Hungary, Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand stated that the USSR and the present Hungarian authorities had failed to cooperate with him, as they had been instructed to do by the UN. He also said, among other things, that "the simple truth is that the Hungarian people are subject to foreign domination."

**December 4** In a Security Council vote, Poland and the USSR vetoed the admission of Mauritania to the UN. The Soviet Union had wanted the simultaneous admission of Outer Mongolia.

**December 5** In a Budgetary Committee discussion on who should pay for UN military and civilian operations in the Congo, the Romanian delegate toed the Soviet line by declaring that Belgium should pay the costs of UN intervention because it was "guilty of aggression." To assess other UN members, the delegate said, would be tantamount to "supporting the aggressor." The Czechoslovak delegate made similar remarks and insisted that immediate steps be taken to stop the UN's "uncontrolled and unlimited expenditures in the Congo," and that the Secretary-General be prohibited from borrowing, even temporarily, from other funds in his custody.

**December 6.** The Economic Committee voted "in principle" for the establishment of a new UN Capital Development Fund aimed at accelerating the economies of underdeveloped countries. The West opposed the action, sponsored by countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, indicating in part that a number of international agencies in and outside the UN already exist for such purposes and deal with the problem effectively. The Soviet bloc countries supported the action, although they could not be pinned down as to the degree of actual financial contribution to the fund. A 25-nation committee will be set up to work out the Fund's purposes, and will report back to the General Assembly in 1961.

**December 7** The Soviet bloc countries abstained when the Economic Committee voted 54 to 0 to adopt a resolution calling for an examination of the possibilities of establishing international credit insurance institutions, and of creating new credit insurance agencies. The crux of the resolution was to give businessmen in underdeveloped countries a better opportunity to get credit abroad. According to the resolution, the General Assembly is to take note of the need to adopt all feasible measures to expand the "flow of private capital to economically less developed countries." The capital would become "freely usable" in long-term loans and be insured against possible "political and economic instability." The Soviet bloc countries have fought against private capital investment and economic help on

the grounds that such help is a continuation of economic exploitation of underdeveloped countries.

**December 8** Charging UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld with a "lack of good will," the Hungarian government made him "personally responsible" for the issuance of Sir Leslie Munro's special annual report on Hungary. In a letter to Hammarskjöld, Hungary's chief UN delegate Janos Peter claimed that the Secretary-General had refused several invitations to come to Hungary in his official capacity. He did not indicate, however, when such invitations were made. (Hammarskjöld had stated previously that he had been invited to Hungary, but not in connection with the Hungarian question.) Peter further stated that UN organs had been used to further cold war activities against Hungary, that the UN Secretariat continued to cooperate with open and public enemies of Hungary, and that the Budapest government had shown unimaginable tolerance in regard to "illegal, unconstitutional, outrageous actions committed against the constitutional order of Hungary through reports of so-called special representatives." The Hungarian UN delegation issued a re-

port in a similar vein, declaring that the Munro report "falsified" the whole background of the Hungarian question.

A Czechoslovak draft resolution entitled, "Appeal for maximum support to efforts of newly emerging States for strengthening their independence," ran into opposition from the Brazilian delegate, who objected to the statement that new States "should not enter into alliances or allow foreign bases on their territory." The Brazilian representative in the special Political Committee said that this was "tantamount to imposing on them a course which does not take into account their freedom of choice." Such alliances, he pointed out, were objectionable only when forced on the newly independent countries against their will. He also emphasized that independence did not consist in "external manifestations, such as a flag, an anthem and foreign representations," but rather in the effective mastery of political and economic life. "Ideological slogans," which were nothing but the echo of a foreign voice, he maintained, could follow after independence and endanger it.

## Eastern Europe Overseas

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*The East European Satellites have played a little-publicized but important part in the Communist drive to win friends and influence among countries that are not allied to the West. Trade missions, technicians and cultural delegations are in constant movement between the capitals of Eastern Europe and the "uncommitted countries." We give below a summary of the most important contacts made in the last month.*

**November 1** A Latin American and African student delegation arrived in Budapest to study Hungarian higher education and meet Latin American and African youths studying in Hungary. The delegation is composed of the leaders of students' organizations of Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Puerto Rico, Liberia, Sierra Leone and West Africa who attended the Sixth Congress of the International Federation of Students in Baghdad. (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest].)

Hungary and Burma established diplomatic relations. Laszlo Heczei was appointed Hungary's diplomatic representative in Burma. He will continue to act also as Hungarian ambassador to India and representative in Ceylon. (Radio Budapest.)

**November 4** Poland and the UAR signed a three-year trade and payments agreement in Cairo. Poland will export machinery, coal, coke, chemicals, radio and television sets to Egypt, and will import cotton, manganese ore,

phosphates, lead, flax, and other goods. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw].)

Czechoslovakia and India signed a three-year trade and payments agreement and protocol on exchange of goods for 1961, which provides for a 40 percent increase in volume over 1960, with a total value of 400 million *koruny*. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague].)

**November 7** The first Polish Ambassador to Cuba arrived in Havana. The Cuban Ambassador is already in Warsaw. (Radio Warsaw.)

**November 7** Czechoslovakia turned over for operation to the UAR an oil refinery in Homs, Syria. The Syrian region of the UAR ordered a 30-megawatt power station from Czechoslovakia to be completed by 1963.

**November 9** Polish shipping representatives returned from a six-month visit to Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, Ghana and Guinea, where they discussed shipping and fishing

cooperation. An agreement was signed with the Guinean government on the organization of a Polish-Guinean fishing enterprise. (PAP [Warsaw].)

**November 10** Czechoslovakia will start construction next year on a kitchen appliance manufacturing plant in Santa Clara, Cuba. (CTK [Prague].)

A protocol on the 1961 goods exchange within the framework of the trade agreement between Romania and India was signed in Bucharest. Romania will export to India oil industry equipment, power equipment, electric motors, diesel engines, machine tools, drugs and chemicals, and other goods. India will send Romania iron ore, cotton yarn and textiles, jute products, pepper, tea, and other goods. (Radio Bucharest.)

**November 11** Czechoslovakia signed a contract with Iraq for complete equipment of a factory to manufacture spare parts for oil refineries, delivery beginning in 1961. Czechoslovak personnel will put the new factory into operation. (Radio Prague.)

**November 14** Hungary named Laszlo Gyáros ambassador to Guinea. (Radio Budapest.) (Laszlo Gyáros was Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman in the Kadar regime after the Revolt, and later president of the Institute of Cultural Relations. He is a reserve colonel in the Soviet Army.—Ed.)

**November 16** Czechoslovakia is dispatching additional diesel sets to the UAR according to contract. The order is for a value of 37 million *koruny*, for delivery in 1961-63. Czechoslovak technicians will be sent to help assemble the sets. (Radio Prague.)

A Czechoslovak economic delegation arrived in Liberia to conduct talks on Liberian exports of palm oil, palm kernels, coffee, cocoa, rubber and timber. (Radio Monrovia.)

**November 16** Poland and Tunisia signed a long-term trade agreement on November 11 in Tunis. Poland will supply complete industrial plants and installations, for which Tunisian credits will be granted, and will buy from Tunisia phosphates, iron ore, and other raw materials. (PAP [Warsaw].)

**November 18** Czechoslovakia will deliver pumps and road-building machines worth 460,000 *koruny* to Afghanistan. Quick delivery terms were a determining consideration in the Afghan order for the Czechoslovak products. (Radio Prague.)

**November 21** Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and an entourage of Cambodian dignitaries arrived in Czechoslovakia on a State visit. (A friendship and cooperation agreement and a cultural agreement between the two countries was signed on November 27.) (Radio Prague.)

**November 22** A meeting of Bulgarian and UAR public works officials agreed on the purchase of the power station already established by a Bulgarian company at Ar-Rastan dam for 500,000 Syrian lira. This station will be attached to the Homs-Homach electricity authority. (Radio Damascus.)

**November 23** A UAR government delegation left Poland after a two-week study of the Polish fishing industry and discussion on Polish cooperation in the development of UAR deep sea fishing.

**November 27** UAR Syrian officials signed contracts with Bulgaria covering the planning of the towns of Jablah and Ar-Rastan. (Radio Damascus.)

The Bulgarian steamer "Bulgaria" has left Tangiers after unloading a cargo of arms which were subsequently taken under strict police supervision to the Algerian frontier. This is the largest arms cargo to reach Morocco to date. (Radio Algiers.)

**November 28-29** Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria sent telegrams congratulating Mauritania on the occasion of its liberation from colonial domination. (CTK [Prague]; BTA [Sofia].) [Mauritania's admission as a newly independent nation to the United Nations was vetoed by the Soviet Union on December 4.]

**November 28** A scientific and technical cooperation agreement, a trade agreement, and a cultural pact were signed by Czechoslovakia and Ghana on November 23 in Accra. (CTK [Prague].)

A delegation of city officials from Havana, headed by Havana Mayor Jose Llanus, arrived in Prague to study the national committee system of municipal administration. (Radio Prague.)

**November 29** The editor of the Indonesian newspaper *Bintang Timur* and member of the Supreme Advisory Council of Indonesia, M. Armunanto, concluded a two-week visit to Czechoslovakia, where he surveyed agricultural methods. Armunanto called for trade talks between the two countries. (Radio Prague.)

A delegation of the Cypriot General Labor Federation left for Cyprus after a two-week stay in Bulgaria. (Radio Sofia.)

**November 30** Czechoslovakia has delivered equipment ordered for two tanneries in the Egyptian region of the UAR. The tanneries will go into operation at the beginning of 1961, and in addition to manufacturing leather will serve as training centers for experts who will later be assigned to other tanneries. Eight Egyptian experts are now on a study tour of Czechoslovak tanneries. (CTK [Prague].)

**December 3** A group of Togo and Somaliland students arrived in Bucharest. They will study at the oil, gas and geology institute, and at the medical and pharmaceutical institute. (Radio Bucharest.)

**December 4** The Czechoslovak government announced the appointment of Martin Macuch as Ambassador to the Republic of Mali. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague].)

**December 6** The State Prosecutor of Cuba, Santiago Cuba Fernandez, is visiting Czechoslovakia at the invitation of the Union of Czechoslovak Lawyers. He will study Czechoslovak legislation and meet representatives of Czechoslovak jurisprudence and legal practice. (CTK [Prague].)

# Current Developments

- INTERNATIONAL:** *Communist press hails the Moscow Declaration of December 5 (p. 36).*  
*World Peace Council meets in Bucharest, denounces West German "militarism" (p. 46).*
- POLITICAL:** *Hungarian Communists start new drive to collectivize agriculture (p. 43).*  
*Polish Writers' Congress meets in Sopot (p. 40).*
- ECONOMIC:** *Polish sulfur mine opens at Tarnobrzeg, financed with Czechoslovak credits (p. 41).*  
*Czechoslovak National Assembly approves Third Five Year Plan (p. 42).*

## AREAWIDE

### Moscow Conference Ends

Although the debate over who was the victor in the alleged contest between the Communist Chinese and the Soviet Parties in the ideological struggle for supremacy will undoubtedly continue among Western pundits, the 1960 Moscow Declaration seems to represent little new as far as the Soviet bloc is concerned. Approved by 81 Communist Parties after more than three weeks of secret deliberations, the statement, published in Moscow's *Pravda*, December 5, in the main reiterated the Khrushchev middle way between the ideological dangers of "revisionism" and "dogmatism," and his belief that the "Socialist camp" was strong enough to bury capitalism through peaceful coexistence short of war.

For the past year there has been a conflict between the Communist Chinese "dogmatic" belief that between the "imperialist" and the Communist States war is inevitable, and Khrushchev's statement that such theses must be updated in view of the growing strength of the Communist nations. In the manifesto, after harshly castigating "American imperialism" for its "policy of preparing a new aggressive war," the Soviet position was restated:

"The foundations of the capitalist system have decayed so greatly that in many countries the ruling imperialist bourgeoisie is no longer able independently to oppose the growing forces of democracy and progress. . . . In conditions of peace, the Socialist system is unfolding more

and more extensively its superiority over the capitalist system in all fields of the economy, culture, science and technology. . . . The superiority of the forces of Socialism and peace will become absolute. In these conditions, still prior to the complete victory of Socialism on earth, while capitalism is preserved in parts of the world, a real opportunity will arise to exclude a world war from the life of society. The victory of Socialism throughout the world will finally eliminate the social and national reasons for the outbreak of any wars. Communists of the whole world unanimously and systematically defend peaceful coexistence, decisively struggle for the prevention of war. Communists must unflinchingly work among the masses to prevent underestimation of the possibilities of peaceful coexistence and, at the same time, to prevent underestimation of the danger of war."

The last sentence in this quotation neatly illustrates the Sino-Soviet compromise on this question, but, taken as a whole, the doctrine of peaceful coexistence will probably be the matrix of Communist foreign policy for the next few years.

### To Each His Own

Harking back to the Moscow Declaration of 1957, the new statement noted the 1957 document's correct formulation "that Marxism-Leninism demands creative application of the principles of the Socialist revolution and Socialist construction in accordance with the concrete historical conditions of each individual country and that it does not permit a mechanical copying of the policy and tactics of the Communist Parties of other countries. Disregard of national peculiarities by a proletarian Party may divorce it from life and from the masses and may damage the cause of Socialism."

With regard to the "equality" of all Communist States, the famous formula, "the Socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union," did not appear in the declaration. The USSR was described as being in the "vanguard" of the "Socialist" movement, "the first and most powerful State," the "beacon," "the most experienced and toughest sector in the world Communist movement," etc., but the absence of the familiar phrase may indicate a possible concession to Chinese feelings. Nevertheless, in reporting the document, Radio Prague, Radio Sofia, the Albanian, Romanian and Bulgarian press all used the words, "headed by the Soviet Union." Habit dies hard, but a less worshipful tone in referring to the USSR may emerge in the future.

### ***Ideological Extremes Criticized***

The manifesto explicitly but briefly condemned the Yugoslav variety of "international opportunism, which is a concentrated expression of the theories of the contemporary revisionists." The "Yugoslav revisionists" were also accused of "carrying on subversion against the Socialist camp and the world Communist movement." "Revisionism" was termed the "chief danger" in the Communist world. On the other hand, "dogmatism and sectarianism, in theory and in practice, if a consistent struggle is not carried on against them, can also become the main danger to one or another stage of the development of individual Parties." (Radio Moscow, December 6.) (For a summary of the declaration, see Texts and Documents.)

### ***The Tone of Reportage***

Although the principles contained in the 1960 statement are binding on all 81 Parties, in reporting the news of this historic document what was stressed indicated some degree of disharmony existing beneath the surface of "monolithic unity." Except for Albania, the Eastern European nations followed the main conclusions of the document without any significant changes in interpretation. An example of this can be drawn from the Romanian Party's editorial in *Scinteia* (Bucharest), December 7, by citing its paragraph on the ideological struggle:



"The continued, thorough unmasking of the Yugoslav variety of revisionism is a necessary task of the Communist and workers' Parties. Revisionism misrepresents Marxism-Leninism, empties it of its revolutionary spirit, and leads to the paralyzing and disarming of the working class and the working people's struggle. At the same time the conference drew attention to the harmful nature of dogmatism and sectarianism which can become principal dangers if a consistent fight is not waged against them. The history of the workers' movement shows that dogmatism and sectarianism deprive the Communist Parties of the capacity correctly to appraise in time the changes in life, and what is new in the current historic situation. They lead to the sclerosis of the Communist Parties, to isolation from the masses, and to gauche and adventurous actions."

By contrast, Albania's Party organ, *Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana), December 7, devoted four paragraphs to the condemnation of "revisionism" and one sentence to the dangers of "dogmatism." The Tirana publicists declared:

"The statement outlines the true face of the Yugoslav revisionists as traitors to Marxism-Leninism and condemns their activities. . . . The future unmasking of the leaders of Yugoslav revisionism and the active fight to protect the Communist and workers' movement from the anti-Leninist ideas of the Yugoslav revisionists continue to be an indispensable task of the Marxist-Leninist Parties."

The Chinese press emphasized at great length the unity of the Parties. *Jen Min Ji Pao* (Peiping), December 7, cursorily mentioned "Yugoslav revisionism" and "the tendencies of dogmatism and sectarianism." Sino-Soviet friendship received fulsome praise and was described as so close that "no force can separate the two Parties or the two countries, which are bound together by a common ideal, a common cause, and common interests."

Although both the Albanians and the Chinese lauded the concept of peaceful coexistence, they took great care to warn of the "imperialists," particularly the United States, who were aggressive by nature and threatening "universal



"The United States has found a new military base."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), December 1, 1960

peace and security." The Albanian statements were markedly different in tone from those of the other East European Satellites.

### Yugoslavia, Albania and the Bloc

"Cold wars" may come and go, but Albanian-Yugoslav relations remain as hostile as ever. The other nations of the Soviet bloc have reacted ambivalently to this struggle, attempting to maintain solidarity with Albania as a full-fledged member of the "Socialist camp" without damaging the détente which has recently characterized their relations with Belgrade. The celebration of both the Albanian and Yugoslav national holidays, respectively November 28 and 29, pointed up the dilemma. Official cables addressed to President Tito for this occasion not only congratulated the "Yugoslav peoples" on their holiday but often expressed good wishes for Tito's "personal happiness." The bloc press was silent on the subject of "Yugoslav revisionism" and in some cases, notably in the Polish Party organ *Trybuna Ludu*, printed articles of equal length on developments within Albania and Yugoslavia. The most marked difference in tone came from Peiping, which sent a brief congratulatory wire to Belgrade while effusively feting the Albanians, to the extent that the Communist Party chief, Mao Tse-tung himself, attended a reception at the Albanian Embassy in Peiping.

Characteristically, the Yugoslav envoys replied to the Soviet bloc expression of goodwill by stressing the fact that "everyone builds Socialism as he thinks best fitted to his own conditions." This last statement was made by the Yugoslav Ambassador to Hungary, and, significantly, was broadcast over Radio Budapest, November 28. It is unlikely that such latitude would have been permitted a few months earlier.

For the Albanians, however, the celebrations were used to castigate the Yugoslavs. Koso Theodhosi, an alternate member of the Albanian Politburo, at a meeting in Tirana, November 28, spoke of the necessity for Albania to defend itself against the "imperialists and their experienced lackey . . . modern revisionism, especially that of Yugoslavia." He went on to say:

"In their treacherous way, the revisionists want to deprive Marxism-Leninism of its revolutionary nucleus in the most essential matters such as the revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . and thus paralyze the revolutionary movement of the working class, give a free hand to the bourgeoisie to recover the positions it has lost and prolong the life of capitalism." (Radio Tirana, November 28.)

Belgrade took cognizance of this attack as well as of Communist Chinese hostility. *Politika* (Belgrade), December 2, stated: "Albania's representatives . . . made a point of abusing Yugoslavia as much as possible, mainly by telling stories long known to be untrue. . . . The Chinese Premier even accused Yugoslavia of subversive activity against Albania. The Albanian leaders are certainly in need of Chinese support in maintaining . . . an adventurous foreign policy. . . . This is even more likely . . . on the occasion of National Day, when civilized people do not address



"Where have you been, Joe?"

"You know what, Ivan? We have a little base in Cuba, and we've just been fishing there."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), November 10, 1960

rude words or lies to one another—not even to someone who is not a friend."

### Chinese Praise for Albania

The Peiping press carried numerous front-page articles on the successes achieved by Albania since the liberation. At the Albanian reception in Peiping Chinese Premier Chou En-lai lauded the "Socialist construction in Albania" although Albania "is surrounded by capitalist countries, and imperialism and the Yugoslav Tito clique have never for a day stopped their subversive and crude activities." Chou spoke at length of "our common ideological basis and common aims . . . between two peoples who share each other's weal and woe."

In reply, the Albanian representative hailed the "correctness of the policies of the Chinese Communist Party's three red banners—the general line, the big leap forward, and the peoples' communes." (Radio Peiping, November 29.)

### Tito's New Constitution

Yugoslav President Tito announced on the occasion of National Day that a new constitution would be promulgated which would curb the role of the State in local and economic affairs. The starting point, according to Tito, "must be man as producer and manager, while the State appears only as coordinator." Within the framework of assigned tasks, it appears that individual enterprises will be free to fill their assignment in any way they think best, and in this area, the workers' councils will play a major part. Local communes will also be strengthened. Although the Soviet bloc has decentralized its economies in recent years, the new Yugoslav statutes will serve to widen the theoretical gap between Belgrade and Moscow. (*The New York Times*, November 29.)

### Agreements with Soviet Bloc

Poland and Yugoslavia signed a long-term trade accord on December 6. Both nations expect that the agreement

will result in a turnover during the five-year period of approximately 320 million dollars. Under the agreement, Yugoslavia will supply Poland with machines and equipment, including ship motors, zinc concentrate, lead, various chemicals, leather products, and agricultural products such as corn and tobacco. Poland will export to Yugoslavia machines, industrial plants, rolled products, coke, consumer goods, various chemicals and products of the metal and paper industries. (Radio Belgrade, December 5.)

Belgrade concluded other important agreements with East Germany and Czechoslovakia. An accord on technical-scientific matters was signed in Berlin, December 2, and a protocol for the exchange of goods between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in 1961 was signed in Belgrade, November 19. The latter agreement envisaged a trade volume between the two countries to the amount of 62 million dollars, or 20 percent more than the level attained this year. Yugoslavia will export to Czechoslovakia farm produce and foodstuffs, ore, wood products, chemicals, machines, transport equipment and consumer goods. Czechoslovakia will export coke, chemical and pharmaceutical products, glass, machines, and consumer goods. (Radio Belgrade, November 19.)

## POLAND


### Aftermath of Moscow Conference

The first Polish report on the Moscow Communist summit meeting came in a speech by Party chief Wladyslaw Gomulka in Katowice on the eve of Miners' Day, December 3. He did not allude to any divergences of opinion between the Soviet bloc and Communist China, but stressed the unanimous support of all the Parties for Soviet Premier Khrushchev's contention that "the struggle between Socialism and capitalism can and should be resolved, not by a new world war, but by means of peaceful competition between the two social systems."

In conclusion, Gomulka declared himself in favor of the Soviet disarmament proposals and expressed the opinion that the Communists were strong enough to enforce them on the rest of the world: "Disarmament, the basic condition for the establishment of permanent peace, must and can be forced upon the imperialists, thanks to the peaceful policies and superiority of the Socialist camp and the pressure of the working class and the large working masses in the West bending under the weight of the armaments burden and searching for salvation from the threat of nuclear war." (Radio Warsaw, December 3.)

### Krupp's Manager in Poland

Berthold Beitz, general manager of the West German Krupp industrial empire, visited Poland at the personal invitation of Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz. His arrival went unannounced in the regime press. Although relations between the two countries have been characterized recently



Secretary of the Treasury Anderson and Under Secretary of State Dillon conferring over the condition of the US dollar: "He keeps losing weight!"

Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), November 23, 1960

by vehement attacks against West German "militarism" and "revanchism" by high Polish government and Party officials, Herr Beitz' trip is no great shock, since he had met Cyrankiewicz at the Poznan trade fair last summer, and at that time dined with him and with Party chief Gomulka. Nevertheless, this was the first time since the formation of the Bonn Republic that an important West German figure had been received in Warsaw under official aegis.

During his stay, the industrialist visited the steel city of Nowa Huta and the oil center of Krosno. During the Nazi occupation of Poland, Herr Beitz managed the oil industry in Krosno and is reported to have treated his employees honorably. (*The New York Times*, December 7.)

### Correspondent Expelled

Eve Fournier, Warsaw correspondent for the Paris daily *France Soir*, was asked to leave Poland by the Ministry of the Interior before December 4. Radio Warsaw, December 3, claimed that the action resulted from her "fabricated reportage of the alleged strike at a textile factory in Zambrow."

### Editor Ousted

Symptomatic of the tightening regime control over the press was the reported dismissal of 35-year-old Mieczyslaw Rakowski as editor-in-chief of the Warsaw weekly *Polityka*. No official word of his removal appeared in the Polish press, but the disappearance of his name from the masthead of the first December issue of *Polityka* confirmed earlier Western reports that he would be ousted. The weekly, published since 1957, reflected "middle-of-the-road" policies and was considered in this respect to mirror closely Party chief Gomulka's views. One explanation for Ra-

## THERE'S A PLAN FOR EVERYTHING

"Certain bars break sad records. Even in the heat of July and August, the sales of vodka make up 67 percent of their income. Sales of vodka to guests who are blind drunk already, and to their merry female companions, is the order of the day in Warsaw restaurants and bars. And although there is the rule that the first snack or the first dish must not be accompanied by more than a 50-gram glass of alcohol, clients get 100-gram glasses, or pints or quarts, of vodka without a murmur of protest.

"The waiters answer the timid question of some guests, 'Why don't you serve smaller glasses?' with: 'We don't have any smaller glasses, and we have a plan to implement.' At one time some housing block committees and a Committee for National Unity protested against the sale of alcohol in certain disreputable joints near the Main Station, but they met with a violent protest from the Association of the Gastronomic Industry. They were told that it is impossible to stop the sale of alcohol in those restaurants because otherwise they would be unable to fulfill their sales plan."

*Express Wieczorny* (Warsaw), November 18, 1960

kowski's fall from grace was his publication of articles too critical of the contemporary Polish scene. Recently, the popular novelist Jerzy Andrzejewski, who resigned from the Party shortly after the October 1956 upheaval, has penned several critical articles attacking the death penalty, as well as low royalties paid to Polish writers. Never connected with any political faction, moderate Rakowski also holds the important post of Chairman of the Administrative Council of the Union of Polish Journalists.

## Writers' Congress

The 11th Congress of the Union of Polish Writers convened in the Baltic city of Sopot, November 25-26, with 100 writers attending. In the week preceding the conference, Central Committee member Wincenty Krasko and Minister of Culture Tadeusz Galinski reiterated the current Party policy demanding new creative work "whose purport is ideological, which is close to the people and to the work these people are building." Krasko singled out abstract expressionist painting and atonal music for particular criticism, although he admitted that a certain degree of experimentation would be tolerated. He also was careful to distinguish between literature produced during the Stalinist era, terming it "shallow and servile," and what the regime desired, i.e., "mass realistic writing." (*The New York Times*, November 24.)

The Congress itself was a mild affair. The keynote speech, given by Chairman Jaroslav Iwaszkiewicz, hailed the achievements of the Union—development of writers' clubs, better contacts with youth and increased activity on the part of writers' circles in the provinces, notably in

Wroclaw and Poznan. The only cloud on his horizon was the lack of "sufficient interest" in the present day. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], November 26.) The resolutions passed by the Congress were politically inspired, aimed at "the revanchist tendencies and militaristic reawakening in West Germany." To make the nation conscious of this, the education authorities were urged to include extensively in school curricula "the history of the anti-Hitler movement in Europe and Poland." (*Trybuna Ludu*, November 27.)

## Comrades' Courts in Operation

The recently-created "comrades' courts," a regime-sponsored method of trying workers by their peers for minor offenses, held their first trials in Lower Silesian textile plants in November. The cases involved economic abuses, particularly theft of State property. According to Radio Warsaw, November 12, the experience gained in these initial trials will make it possible to iron out such procedures in the rest of the country.

## Gomulka at Miners' Day Celebration

As guest of honor at the 16th annual Miners' Day celebration in Katowice, December 3, Party leader Gomulka delivered his usual address in which he summarized the achievements, shortcomings and future tasks of one of Poland's oldest industries. Having just returned from the Moscow summit session devoted to Communist ideological solidarity, the Party Leader also discussed international affairs (see above).

Opening with words of praise for the mining industry, he noted, however, that the Five Year Plan ending in 1960 had not been fully carried out. This, he explained, could be traced to the "full abolition of the military mining corps, the reduction of Sunday work" and the exhaustion of certain mines. He called attention to the "greatly improved working conditions" in the industry: reduction of working hours (in 1960 the underground working day was reduced to 7.5 hours in the majority of mines), gradual abandonment of Sunday work and overtime, and a 57 percent increase in money wages during the five-year period. He cautioned, however, that further improvements would be increasingly dependent on greater labor productivity, since about 55 percent of total production cost in mining is labor. The chief tasks for the period 1961-65—during which time output is to increase by the relatively modest figure of 9.2 percent—are to carry out the large-scale program for mechanization and automation of production and to expand the output of coking coal. His main criticism was directed not at the mining industry itself but at the managers of industrial enterprises who, because of the low cost of coal, fail to economize in its use. While production rose by only 9.5 million tons during the period 1956-60, domestic consumption of coal increased by 16.7 million tons, reducing the amount available for export. "The balance sheet of foreign trade does not allow us to reduce the current level of coal exports in the coming years." (Radio Warsaw, December 3.)



From a recent exhibition of photographs in Warsaw.

*Swiat* (Warsaw), November 27, 1960

### Sulfur Combine Opens

Poland's first sulfur mine and processing combine—financed in part by \$25 million worth of credits extended by Czechoslovakia in 1957—went into operation in Tarnobrzeg, December 4. First Party Secretary Gomulka, on hand to deliver the ceremonial address, described the project as “a good example of cooperation within the framework of the Socialist camp in the field of investments for exploitation of the country's raw materials.” The Czechoslovak loan was contracted under the auspices of the Soviet bloc Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. It carries an annual two percent interest charge and will be repaid in part from the resulting sulfur production. Gomulka, who is an ardent advocate of intra-bloc investment cooperation and a critic of COMECON's failure to induce more assistance of this kind, went on to say:

“We think that, considering the difficulties encountered by every country in investments of this kind, this example should be copied in other sectors, for without it, it will be difficult to solve the problem of raw materials important to the Socialist camp, and at the same time to level out the differences in the stages of national economic development which still exist. We frequently have expressed this point of view. We did so in the fourth plenum of our Party, and do so again here today.”

With the opening of this domestic source, the Party

leader said, “there is a chance that we shall be entirely free from this import in the course of the next few years. . . .” Polish imports of refined sulfur, which is of critical importance in the development of the chemical industry, amounted to 57,000 tons during 1960. Production targets for 1961 and 1965 are set at 130,000 tons and 400,000 tons respectively.

The Czechoslovak delegate in attendance for the ceremonial opening spoke in glowing terms of the “fraternal cooperation among the Socialist countries,” but he said nothing about additional financial aid of this kind in the future. (Radio Warsaw, December 4.)

### Foreign Trade Balance Improves

Poland's exports rose more than imports during the first nine months of 1960, according to the economic weekly *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), November 20. Exports rose in value by 12.1 percent and imports by 9.9 percent, while total industrial production increased 10.4 percent. The struggle with the foreign exchange deficit—which at mid-year stood at \$155 million—has been one of Poland's most distressing problems in the past few years. Foreign credits have filled the gap in the past, but these are now drying up. “The choice,” commented one newspaper, “is simple: either we must agree to a lower rate of increase of national income, to stagnation of consumption and investment, or we must take a larger portion of total production for export.” (*Przegląd Kulturalny* [Warsaw], October 20.)

Part of the difficulty—aside from simple shortages of important export items—is obtaining hard, convertible currency in the West. Two categories of goods, coal and agricultural products, which bulk very large in total Polish exports, have met with dwindling markets in Western Europe and a consequent worsening of the terms of trade—i.e., lower prices for Poland's exports relative to what it must pay for its imports.

Two encouraging signs appeared during November. The Italian government broke its long-standing reluctance to enter long-term agreements with Communist regimes and signed a new trade pact with Poland running for four years. Along with the trade agreement, which provides for increasing the turnover of goods to \$80 million in 1961 as compared with \$50 million in 1960, and for an annual 10 percent rise in subsequent years, Poland won a bid for \$30 million worth of five- to six-year commercial credits. During 1961, Polish exports to Italy will amount to \$40 million and imports to \$30 million, while the remaining \$10 will represent imports of investment goods financed under the credit provision. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], November 28.) According to *The New York Times*, November 29, Poland is about \$15 million behind in its payments to Italy—a fact which induced the Italian government to grant the Polish request for credits.

On November 17, President Eisenhower signed a special regulation officially granting most-favored-nation treatment to Polish goods entering the United States. Party leader Gomulka, upon his return home from the United Nations General Assembly session this fall, claimed he had been

given assurance that this privilege (which was withdrawn from Polish goods in 1951) would soon be extended. Polish trade experts predicted that, in consequence of such a move, exports to the US would increase by 50 percent in 1961. (See *East Europe*, November, p. 43.)

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### **Cambodian Prince Feted**

Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia arrived in Prague, November 21, for a seven-day State visit. The Cambodian Chief of State in his speech at the airport stressed his country's "strict neutrality," describing it as "a rough and difficult path, as we have learned through foreign interference, interventions, and threats." (Radio Prague, November 21.) During the visit, a treaty of friendship was concluded between the two States. In the sphere of economic cooperation, Czechoslovakia will continue to supply machinery, equipment and complete installations for Cambodian industry as well as technicians. The final communique announced the acceptance by Czechoslovak President Novotny of an invitation to visit Cambodia. (Radio Prague, November 28.)

### **National Assembly Meets**

The National Assembly convened in Prague on November 16 to place its stamp of approval on the government's draft of the Third Five Year Plan (1961-65). As outlined by planning chief Otakar Simunek, the targets were the same as those approved by the Third National Party Con-

ference in July (see *East Europe*, October, pp. 16-18 for a description of the shape and goals of the Plan). Simunek once again placed special stress on higher productivity as the basis of the 56 percent increase in industrial production slated for the five-year period. In agriculture, where 86.7 percent of the agricultural land now belongs to the "Socialist sector" and where production has stagnated in recent years, the Plan prescribes a 50 percent increase in investment outlay as compared with the Second Five Year Plan, including large-scale mechanization and a more intensive use of fertilizers.

The National Assembly also approved the new coat of arms recently announced (see *East Europe*, August, p. 35), intended to symbolize the transformation of the Czechoslovak People's Republic into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], November 17.)

### **Aid for Families with Low Incomes**

Low-income families who send their children to creches, nurseries and kindergartens have been relieved of all financial obligations for the use of these child-care services, according to a government decree of November 14. Effective from November 1, parents with one child and a net income of no more than 1,000 *koruny*, 2 children and an income of no more than 1,500 *koruny*, 3 children and an income of no more than 2,000 *koruny*, etc., are not required to pay fees or make contributions to these institutions; other families pay according to their monthly net incomes and number of children at "substantially reduced rates." The new regulation is said to represent a saving of almost 80 million *koruny* for the population, a sum which will be supplied directly by State support. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], November 16.)

### **Artists and Sculptors Meet**

The first Congress of the Czechoslovak Plastic Artists was held in Prague, November 30-December 2. Party ideologist Jiri Hendrych enunciated the Party's aesthetic doctrine, which, not surprisingly, turned out to be a demand for "Socialist realism." As Hendrych put it: "The direction in which the Communist Party orients its entire artistic effort is known—to increase the social effectiveness of art in the education of Communist man. . . . Hence, the basic theme of Socialist art is, and shall remain, man, man, the creator of a new society." He condemned abstract art for "its desertion from life and its nihilistic relationship to the people of our society in which the greatest mission of art is to portray the beauty of a Socialist country and to enrich the life of the people." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], December 2.)

In the closing message to the Central Committee, the Congress did not deviate from the principles laid down by Hendrych: "We want to construct an organization which . . . springs from the Marxist-Leninist world. The greetings we send . . . also express our firm conviction and promise that under the leadership of the Communist Party, loyal to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, we will fulfill our tasks with honor." (*Rude Pravo*, December 3.)



Rents in Czechoslovakia are so low that many landlords cannot afford to maintain their properties. A new law permits the tenants to take over the maintenance themselves, as shown in the happy scene above.

*Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), December 3, 1960

## ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

"The press in a Socialist society has in principle a different task from what it has in the bourgeois order. The bourgeoisie uses its press to divert the working people's attention from important questions affecting their life, from the struggle against exploitation. . . .

"The contrary applies in a Socialist State where the press is completely free and serves the sole, highly responsible purpose of helping to organize and educate the masses for the fulfillment of the tasks of developing Socialist society. . . . Whereas the bourgeois press misleads the working people, diverts their attention from the problems of the class war, the press in a Socialist society educates the working people, leads them toward active participation in the direction of the economy and the administration of the State, toward deciding on all questions connected with the development of the society. . . .

"A present-day task of our newspapers, and a most urgent one, is to show the strength of the Socialist camp and the fulfillment of its historical role in the present phase, in the economic competition with the most highly developed capitalist States. A prominent place in the work of a Socialist newspaper belongs to the struggle against war, for disarmament, for a lasting peace. And we can state that our press, radio and television plays an important role in this field both at home and abroad."

*Zivot Strany* (Prague), No. 18, 1960

Elected respectively as Chairman and Secretary of the 15-member Presidium were Josef Malejovski and Miloslav Jiranek, both sculptors.

## Conference on Wage Reforms

The recent reforms in wages and norms and the proposed reduction in the work week were the subjects of a government-trade union conference in Prague on November 10 and 11. Politburo member Jaromir Dolansky, who delivered the main report at the conference, said that the wage and norm reforms carried out in the principal branches of industry during the past year and a half had been successful. The purpose was to replace antiquated norms with new norms more fitted to technological conditions, or in some cases with time wages. The objective was to raise productivity without any radical change in wage levels.

According to Dolansky, this objective has been attained while at the same time many workers have received higher wages. But he warned that shortcomings still exist and much remains to be done. During the coming Five Year Plan, the wage and norm reforms will be extended to the building industry, internal trade, municipal industries, transport and communication. The difficulties will be intensified by the program for shortening the work week to

42 hours (40 in mining) successively in different branches of the economy throughout the five-year period. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], November 11.)

## "Juvenile Delinquents" Arrested

Arrested for "theft, rowdiness and other moral crimes" were fourteen Prague youths. Customarily the regime claims that delinquents come from "bourgeois families," but in these cases, Radio Prague, November 15, declared that the culprits "came from various walks of life, some of them from workers' families, some of them from families of employees and teachers." In order to gain time for "reading pocket books and camping," they "inflicted injuries on themselves and obtained money from the health fund for this purpose."

## Private Enterprise Report

At the end of the first half of 1960, there were 666 private trade enterprises left in Prague, according to the Council of the Prague National Committee, charged with liquidating private business in the capital. Private tradesmen included 179 men's tailors, 30 dressmakers, 50 barbers, 33 launderers, 47 tobacconists and 5 cabdrivers. Also listed were 85 private doctors' offices and 4 private farmers in the Prague area. (*Lidova Demokracie* [Prague], November 1.)

## HUNGARY

## New Collectivization Drive Begins

Another big push to collectivize Hungarian agriculture—the third since October 1958—was launched at a meeting of the Party Central Committee on October 28-29 (see *East Europe*, December, p. 41). The resolution of the Party's ruling body was not published until mid-November, in the official theoretical monthly *Tarsadalmi Szemle*. Buried in the resolution was the following passage:

"The Central Committee, taking into consideration the political-economic position of the country, the past results of the collective movement, as well as taking account of the transitory difficulties, holds that it is possible and necessary to make a considerable step forward during the course of the winter in the field of the Socialist transformation of agriculture with which the mass numerical development... [of the collective farms] will be essentially completed."

Party leader Kadar reiterated these intentions in a speech before the National Assembly on December 9, stating that in order "to put an end to uncertainty" which was damaging farm production, it was necessary to conclude the collectivization of agriculture. He added: "This will in principle be done during this winter." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], December 10.)

Thus, despite numerous practical problems besetting the

collectives formed during the last two years, the regime is determined to complete the process this winter by absorbing the 25 percent of the arable land which is still in the hands of the independent peasants. The success of the past two seasonal campaigns—which were restricted to the winter months after the harvest when the least possible damage could be done to production—surprised even the authorities in Budapest. Each successive drive brought another 20 percent of the arable land under collectivization. When last winter's campaign was halted in February and attention turned to consolidating the gains, approximately 70 percent of the arable land (879,000 peasants) was in the "Socialist sector." Since then the figure has risen slightly to about 75 percent, of which about 57.3 percent represents the collective farms.

Judging from the CC's October communique, the methods which worked so well in the past (see *East Europe*, September, 1959, pp. 15-22 and March, 1960, pp. 41-42) will again be applied. The "voluntary principle" was endorsed as before, and the peasant is said to have the choice of joining or not joining a collective. But this choice is exercised only after grueling rounds of "persuasion" by teams of Party agitators who occupy the villages one by one, assisted by local officials, neighboring collective farm leaders, etc.

### A Note of Caution

However, the Central Committee emphasized that getting the peasants into collective farms was only the first step, and the "consolidation" of the farms was "still the chief task." Moreover, the agitators were warned to guard against infringements of the "voluntary principle" and against making "irresponsible promises": "We have to emphasize these matters because now, during the final stages of the work, the danger of conceit, impatience and harmful optimism is particularly great." Evidently this reserve was motivated in part by a fear of undoing the gains already attained and, at the same time, by a realization that the government cannot live up to some of the exaggerated promises made to the peasants in earlier campaigns. Heavy imports of machinery and fertilizers have already placed the foreign trade balance under strain, and foreign debts incurred after the 1956 Revolt are also beginning to fall due. Moreover, the urban population is showing signs of displeasure at the sacrifices it has been forced to make in favor of the peasantry.

The major portion of the resolution, in fact, concentrated on the political and economic tasks of the Party (which has its organizations in 84.6 percent of the existing collectives) in administering the new farms.

These include instilling discipline among the members, increasing Party membership, choosing competent leaders, providing agrarian experts, and devising a workable system of income distribution that will give the members incentive to work on the common land. The role of private household plots in the "transitory period" was emphasized again. "Our Party organizations should make the members understand the essence and aims of the various transitory meas-



The daily physical culture period in a Czechoslovak textile factory. "In Soviet and Chinese plants, calisthenics during working hours are a very common institution, but in our country we can show similar examples only rarely."

Klub (Prague), October 1960

ures which have become necessary in the common and private farms, and mobilize the collective peasants for their effective application." With a view toward slowing the flight of youths from the collective farms, the resolution said that "political persuasion" should be applied to all members of a peasant family—"the young people in particular"—to induce them to join the collective along with their parents.

### Priests Urged to Become Political

A reversal of the Party line condemning the clergy for meddling in politics appeared in the Communist-backed "peace priests" publication, *Katolikus Szó* (Budapest), October 30, which warned priests against the "false front of political neutrality." The editorial stated: "A priest must indulge in politics. . . . He must know about the campaign waged by the Socialist countries for peace and disarmament. . . . He must take a stand, have an opinion regarding problems of the world. . . . Regarding our own country he must know the right answers about the advantages of collective farming and the future of the collective. If this means indulging in politics, well, let every honest Hungarian priest indulge in politics when serving his people and nation."

### Youth Mobilized

Stressing that the chemical industry was the keystone of the second Five Year Plan, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Youth League (KISZ) decided to "mobilize" the young workers in the plants producing chemical machinery and equipment in order to meet the Plan schedule. According to *Nepszabadság* (Budapest), November 4, "KISZ will contribute 100,000 hours of social work toward the construction of new buildings for the chemical

industry by working on Saturdays and Sundays in the camps of 'Young Voluntary Builders' which are set up every summer." KISZ will also contact youth organizations in other "Socialist" countries producing chemical machinery to ask for their aid in making sure that deliveries will not fall behind.

### Writers Welcomed Back Into Fold

The silence of leading Hungarian writers in the months following the 1956 Hungarian Revolt clearly embarrassed the regime. During the past year, however, some of these authors allowed their work to appear in print, and the Party has been eager not to prejudice any possible rapprochement. Latest evidence of the tolerance displayed by the Party press in order to woo recalcitrant writers back into print appeared in the Budapest literary weekly *Elet és Irodalom*, November 4:

"In recent years one of the signs of the revival of our literary life was the fact that several writers, who previously were pushed into the background, began to make themselves heard again. Their silence was due to their reserve, burdened by prejudice and stubborn self-isolation, and to mistrust and impatience on the part of others. The very fact that they have begun to speak up means more than a simple return to literary life. Not only have the well-known rigidities of earlier literary policy been corrected, but in the case of most of the writers concerned, a certain change is noticeable. . . . An atmosphere of confidence, lenient literary policy and criticism, have allowed them to find their footing. We do not expect a complete reversal of attitudes on the part of those who spring . . . from the soil of bourgeois views and aesthetics, all we hope for is gradual orientation and development. . . .

"The process of rapprochement can be observed in the cases not only of two writers such as Geza Ottlik and Magda Szabo; we find it in the recent literary attempts of writers like Aron Tamasi, Janos Kodolanyi, Endre Illes, Istvan Vas, Gyorgy Ronai, Sandor Tatay and Gabor Thurzo."

### Taxes on Self-Employed Codified

The accumulation of tax rules and regulations applying to the self-employed has been reduced to a single structure by a decree of the Council of Ministers on November 3. The new decree, which was to take effect January 1, 1961, covers the rules governing general income taxes paid by independent craft and tradesmen (carpenters, repairmen, etc.), intellectuals and professionals (writers, artists, doctors, etc.) and taxes on income earned from real estate, patents and copyrights. Important exemptions provided in the decree include those granted to independent artisans over age 65 (for women age 60), completely disabled craftsmen in "certain conditions," money from scholarships, prize awards, innovation bonuses and "other exceptional income allowances paid under legal obligation."

The new consolidated tax structure also incorporates a measure taken last June which gave small independent artisans exemption from a year's income tax if they set themselves up in villages with a population of less than

5,000—a move geared to improve the chronic shortage of services in the less densely populated areas. Wages and pensions remain free of income tax obligations. (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], November 4.)

### Teachers' Salaries Raised

In line with the growing deference paid to the specialist in Communist society, the Hungarian regime has raised the rewards for personnel devoted to their training. Effective September 1, in the higher educational institutions, teachers' salaries were increased on the average by 14.5 percent, and those of administrative and technical employees by about 10 percent. At the same time, the decree provided for a more rapid scale of promotion for outstanding personnel in both categories. Altogether, the measure was said to affect nearly 6,000 university and high-school teachers, raising their collective income by 28 million *forint*. (Radio Budapest, November 4.)

### WHO'S FOOLING WHOM?

Last August the leaders of the Young Communist League in Sliven District in Bulgaria promised that their members would produce 1,890 tons of meat by the end of 1960, with the aid of 281 young livestock breeders. On October 23 a correspondent of the youth newspaper *Narodna Mladezh* reported from Sliven that this pledge, like so many others made at the behest of high authorities in Communist countries, was not likely to be fulfilled.

"One can only admire this great promise of the Sliven Komsomol members to produce 1,890 tons of meat in just five months. But if you start going about in the organization, you will see that at many places the 'good beginning' is in very bad shape. Kiro Kostadinov, secretary of the Village Committee of the Komsomol in Kermen, had told the District Committee about the successes of his organization. He drew particular attention to the fact that a single member had raised 400 sheep all by himself and was already delivering them to the State. . . . After a while, as a result of our insistent requests [to see these leading Komsomol workers] the secretary of the Village Committee admitted: 'One of the shepherds is ill, the second is an old man, and this man whom we have listed as a Komsomol member is already over age.' . . .

"We have in front of us a whole pile of paper on which secretaries of village committees have written the fictional pledges of their organizations. Hear S. Georgiev, the secretary of the organization in Karanovo: 'One Komsomol member takes care of 22 calves and will get 17 tons of meat out of them.' When you figure it out, it means that every calf will weigh nearly 800 kilograms at delivery time! . . . In Pet Mogili, in Korten and in several other villages, the secretaries have added to their calculations the meat to be delivered in March and April, with which the Komsomol members have nothing to do."

## DEPENDS ON WHERE YOU LOOK

NEWS ITEM: "The noted American economist Victor Perlo, who returned recently from a trip to the Socialist countries, including Romania, published the first of a series of articles on Romania's economic development in the November issue of the New York *New World Review*. . . . The article, entitled 'Romanian Steel,' describes the author's visit to the Hunedoara iron and steel combine. . . . In 1970, he writes, exactly ten years from now, Romania will have a steel output of 7.5 million tons or 330 kilograms per capita. This is almost equal to the per capita output of the advanced Western countries, and some 70 percent of the average output per capita in the United States."

*Agerpress* (Bucharest), November 17, 1960

NEWS ITEM: "The establishment of installment selling is a real relief for the wage earner, but sometimes it is very hard to get hold of the desired goods. The purchaser has to wander from shop to shop seeking them. Sometimes the goods are priced very cheap but are unobtainable. For example: refrigerators, washing machines, ladies' bicycles. . . ."

*Rominia Libera* (Bucharest), October 16, 1960

NEWS ITEM: "The cooperative 'Incaltamintea' at Tasnad is very anxious to please certain clients . . . for example, people who have two left or two right feet, and people who need shoes size 40 for one foot and shoes size 43 for the other foot. These clients can purchase their shoes at the Tasnad cooperative without fear. . . . And in Targoviste what kind of shoes are the people wearing? . . . Stelian Gogoase, a militia man who needed a pair of boots, had to wait two months to get them. Gheorghe Popescu, a worker at a hardware factory, had to wait a very long time until he got his money back from a pair of shoes which he could not wear because they were badly manufactured. Then also the citizens Teodor Ciobanu and Constantin Jalea, who were consoled with 'come again tomorrow' for endless months until they finally refused to purchase their shoes at the above-mentioned cooperative."

*Urzica* (Bucharest), October 1, 1960

## BULGARIA

## US Senator in Bulgaria

Senator Allan Ellender, Louisiana Democrat, toured Bulgaria and held conversations with high government officials. The official Bulgarian news service reported that he had stated before his departure from Sofia: "I cannot

conceal what I have seen in Bulgaria, despite my short visit, and which impressed me strongly. I am surprised, because in the . . . Western press there are articles which create unfavorable impressions of your country." He urged broadening the cultural and scientific contacts between Bulgaria and the US. (*Rabotnicheskio Delo* [Sofia], November 19.)

## Film Makers Meet

The Third Conference of Socialist Cinematography convened in Sofia, November 15-30. The problems of making contemporary films reflecting the "new relationship" of man to a "Socialist" society was the main topic discussed by Soviet producer Sergei Gerasimov, who severely criticized recent Soviet bloc films for depicting the "type" rather than the individual man or woman. He also castigated "some Polish films" for introducing to the screen "deeply torn people, people who are not typical of our life under the slogan 'True to Life'." The "exaggerated interest" in such "heroes" cannot be justified by the argument that "such people still appear in our society." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], November 30.) The conference finally ended with a communique demanding the creation of films "depicting the man of our time—the reformer of life, the builder of a new society, the passionate defender of the ideals of Communism." (Radio Sofia, November 22.)

## ROMANIA

## Peace Council in Bucharest

A Presidium session of the Communist-backed World Peace Council met in Bucharest, November 23-24. West German "militarism" was attacked by the speakers, in particular East German Politburo member Albert Norden, who keynoted the discussion of international affairs by stating: "Peace and quiet will only prevail in Europe when and if West German militarism is called to order." In the "struggle for peace," Norden pointed out that "the nations had achieved some noteworthy though partial successes, as was illustrated by the debate at the United Nations and the atom bomb test ban which had been enforced." (Radio [East] Berlin, November 24.)

## Back to "Normal"

In the wake of the de-Stalinization campaign, numerous towns, streets and public buildings named after the Soviet leader had to be re-named or called by their prewar title. This process is still going on. Since mid-November, Radio Bucharest has been referring to Stalin City by its former name, Brasov. No decree has appeared to confirm the change, but it is hardly likely that the announcer has been making slips of the tongue.

# Texts and Documents

## SUMMARY OF THE MOSCOW STATEMENT

*The long deliberations in Moscow by the representatives of 81 Communist Parties ended early in December with the release of a 20,000-word statement on world problems. It was considered by most observers to be a document of historic importance for the ideology and tactics of world Communism, although there was much disagreement as to what it signified for the ideological dispute between Moscow and Peiping. Below is a summary of the statement as broadcast by Radio Moscow on December 5.*

THE TUESDAY issue of *Pravda* publishes the statement adopted by the conference of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in November. The conference discussed pressing world problems and further efforts to insure peace, national independence, democracy, and Socialism. It went on record with an identity of views on all matters considered. Now we hear a resume of the conference statement:

The Communist and Workers' Parties, the statement says, unanimously reaffirm their loyalty to the Declaration and peace manifesto adopted in 1957. These documents of creative Marxism-Leninism defined the basic positions of the international Communist movement concerning the major world problems and contributed in large measure to uniting the efforts of the Communist and Workers' Parties in the struggle to achieve a common goal.

These documents remain the militant banner and guide for the actions of the entire international Communist movement. Our age, whose main content is the transition from capitalism to Socialism, initiated by the Great October Socialist Revolution, is an age of struggle between the two opposing social systems, an age of Socialist revolution and revolution for national liberation, an age of the breakdown of imperialism and abolition of the colonial system.

It is an age, said the statement, when more and more peoples make the transition to the Socialist path and Socialism and Communism triumph on a worldwide scale. It is the principal characteristic of our time, the statement emphasizes, that the world Socialist system is becoming the decisive factor in the development of society. The consolidation and development of the Socialist system exert an ever

greater influence on the struggle of the peoples in the capitalist countries. By the force of its example the world Socialist system is revolutionizing the thinking of the working people in the capitalist countries. It inspires them to fight capitalism and greatly facilitates such a fight.

### Capitalism Disintegrating

The statement points out that the world capitalist system is going through an intense process of disintegration and decay. The pillars of the capitalist system, it says, have become so decayed that in many countries the ruling imperialist bourgeoisie can no longer by itself resist the forces of democracy and progress which are growing in scope and becoming more united. The imperialists form military and political alliances under U.S. leadership to fight together against the Socialist camp and to strangle the national liberation, workers, and Socialist movement. However, the peoples are rising with growing determination to fight imperialism, the statement notes. The tide of anti-imperialist, national liberation, anti-war, and class struggle is rising ever higher.

A new stage, the statement says, has begun in the development of the general crisis of capitalism. This is shown by the triumph of Socialism in a large group of European and Asian countries, embracing one third of mankind. It is shown by the powerful growth of the forces fighting for Socialism throughout the world. It is shown by the steady weakening of the imperialists' positions in the economic competition with Socialism. It is shown by the tremendous new upsurge of the struggle for national liberation and by a number of other factors.

The USSR, meanwhile, the statement

points out, is successfully going forward with full-scale construction of a Communist society and all the countries of the Socialist community are making rapid advances.

The people's revolution in China dealt a crushing blow to the positions of imperialism in Asia and contributed in large part to the change in the balance of world forces in favor of Socialism.

The entire large Socialist community has made remarkable progress in the construction of Socialism in a historically brief space of time. The statement emphasizes that the people's governments in the countries of the Socialist community have proved unshakably solid. Restoration of capitalism has now been made socially and economically impossible, not only in the Soviet Union but in the other Socialist countries as well.

The combined forces of the Socialist community reliably safeguard every one of the Socialist countries against encroachment by imperialist reaction. Consequently, the uniting of the Socialist States in one community and the growing unity and steadily increasing strength of that community insure the complete victory of Socialism within the entire system. The time has come, the statement says, when the Socialist States by forming a world system have become an international force exerting a powerful influence on world development.

There are now real opportunities for solving the fundamental problems of the day in a new way, in the interests of peace, democracy, and Socialism. The most burning issue of the day is the problem of war and peace, the statement points out. War is a constant companion of capitalism. The system of exploitation of man by man and the system of extermination of man by man are two aspects of the capitalist system. Imperialism has already inflicted two devastating world wars on mankind and it now threatens to plunge humanity into an even more terrible catastrophe.

### U. S. the Main Aggressor

The statement stresses that U.S. imperialism is the main factor of aggression and war. U.S. imperialists, together with the imperialists of Britain, France, and West Germany, it says, have drawn many countries into NATO, CENTO, SEATO, and other military alignments under the guise of combating the Communist menace. U.S. imperialism has enmeshed the entire so-called free world in a network of military bases aimed first and foremost against the Socialist countries.

The statement also points out that the

imperialist forces of the United States, Britain, and France have made a criminal deal with West German imperialism. Militarism has been revived in West Germany and the restoration of a vast regular army under the command of Nazi generals is being pushed with U.S. imperialists supplying nuclear and rocket weapons and other means of mass extermination. The statement emphasizes that the aggressive plans of the West German imperialists must be opposed by the combined might of all the peaceminded States and nations of Europe. It stresses that an especially big part in the struggle against the aggressive designs of the West German militarists is played by the German Democratic Republic. The meeting, the statement says, considers it the duty of all the countries of the Socialist community and all peaceminded nations to safeguard the GDR, the outpost of Socialism in Western Europe and the true expression of the German nation's desire for peace.

The U.S. imperialists, the statement goes on to say, are also actively reviving a center of war in the Far East. In collusion with the reactionary ruling circles of Japan, they saddled Japan with a new military treaty which pursues aggressive aims against the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic, and other peaceminded countries. The U.S. invaders have occupied the Chinese island of Taiwan and South Korea and are interfering more and more in the affairs of South Vietnam. They have turned all these places into centers of dangerous military provocations and gambles.

The statement also points out that by threatening Cuba with aggression and interfering in the affairs of the peoples of Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, the U.S. imperialists strive to create new seats of war in different parts of the world. They wrecked the Paris meeting of heads of government and have set out to increase international tension and aggravate the cold war. The war menace, the statement says, has grown.

The statement goes on to say that the aggressive nature of imperialism has not changed, but forces have appeared which are capable of frustrating its plans of aggression. War is not fatally inevitable. The time is past when the imperialists could decide at will whether there should or should not be war. The time has come, the statement says, when the attempts of the imperialist aggressors to start a world war can be curbed. World war can be prevented by the joint efforts of the world Socialist community, the international working class, the national liberation movement, and all the countries

opposing war and all peace-loving forces.

The democratic and peace forces have no more pressing task today than to safeguard humanity against a global thermonuclear disaster. The struggle against war cannot be put off until war breaks out. Then it may prove too late for many areas of the globe and for their populations to combat it. The struggle against the threat of a new war must be waged now and not when atom and hydrogen bombs begin to fall, and it must gain in strength from day to day. The important thing is to curb the aggressors in good time, to prevent war, and not let it break out.

### War Not Inevitable

The Communist Party, the statement says, regards the fight for peace as its primary task. We call on the working class, trade unions, cooperatives, women's and youth leagues and associations, and all working people irrespective of political or religious affiliations to give a firm rebuff by means of mass struggle to all acts of aggression of the imperialists. The foreign policy of the Socialist countries, the statement declares, rests on the firm foundation of the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence and economic competition between the Socialist and capitalist countries. In conditions of peace the Socialist system increasingly reveals its advantages over the capitalist system in all spheres of economy, culture, science, and technology.

The near future will bring the forces of peace and Socialism new successes. The Soviet Union will become the leading industrial power in the world. China will become a mighty industrial country. The Socialist system will turn out more than half of the world's industrial products. The peace zones will expand. The working class movement in the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement in the colonies and dependencies will achieve new victories. The disintegration of the colonial system will be completed. The superiority of the forces of Socialism and peace will be absolute.

Under these conditions, the statement says, there will be a real possibility of excluding world war from the life of society even before Socialism achieves complete victory while capitalism still exists in a part of the world. The victory of Socialism all over the world will completely remove the social and national causes of war.

The Communists of all the world, the statement says, uphold peaceful coexistence unanimously and consistently and are vigorously working to forestall war.

Communists must work untiringly among the masses to prevent underestimation of the possibility of averting a world war, that is, underestimation of the possibility of peaceful coexistence, and at the same time to prevent underestimation of the danger of war. The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace and for disarmament, the statement emphasizes. The meeting considers that implementation of the program for general and complete disarmament put forward by the USSR will be of historic importance for the destinies of mankind.

The statement further points out that the complete collapse of colonialism is imminent. The breakdown of the system of colonial slavery under the impact of the national liberation movement, it says, is a development second only to the formation of the world Socialist system in historic importance. An important force in winning national independence and accomplishing far-reaching democratic transformations, the statement emphasizes, is the alliance of the working class and peasantry. This alliance should be the basis of a broad national front. The strength and stability of this alliance will determine to no small degree the extent to which the national bourgeoisie participates in the struggle for liberation.

### Support for National Democracy

In the present historical situation, the statement says, in many countries domestic and international conditions arise favoring the establishment of independent national democracy, a State which consistently upholds political and economic independence, fights imperialism and the latter's military alignments, and opposes bases on its own territory, a State that resists the new forms of colonialism and the infiltration of imperialist capital and rejects dictatorial and despotic methods of government, and a State in which the people are insured broad democratic rights and freedoms. The formation and consolidation of national democracies, the statement says, enables the countries concerned to make rapid social progress and to play an active part in the people's struggle for peace, against the aggressive policies of the imperialist camp, and for complete abolition of the colonialist yoke.

The meeting expressed its solidarity with all the people of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Oceania who are waging a gallant anti-imperialist struggle.

The statement examines the prospect of the working class movement in the capital-

*(Continued on page 53)*

# Book Review

## Scholars on Russia

THE TRANSFORMATION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY, ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE SINCE 1861, edited by Cyril E. Black, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960, \$10.00.

PAUL HOLLANDER

### I

IF THE Cold War has any desirable consequences, one is the motivation it provides Western scholars to devote increasing attention to the understanding and analysis of all aspects of Soviet reality. It has rarely happened that statesmen and policy-makers have been forced to give more weight to information supplied by scholars, often on a highly theoretical level, than to that which can be obtained through "normal" channels of political-diplomatic communication. The absence or curtailment of the more conventional channels of communication and data collection, personal contacts and exchanges, gives scholars added inspiration; not only the statesman but Western public opinion as a whole has to rely for information on the fruits of their patient researches — which in turn places upon them a burden of responsibility unknown to their predecessors in the social sciences.

Although *The Transformation of Russian Society* is the volume's title it is not unreasonable to assume that the primary concern of the editor and contributors was to achieve a greater understanding of present-day Soviet society through a long-term historical

approach. As Prof. Black points out: "It is natural that the revolution of 1917 should have exerted a powerful attraction for students of Russia, but the result has been a focusing of interest in the latest developments and a tendency to treat events before and since the revolution in separate compartments."

He rightly emphasizes that a knowledge of social structure is inseparable from that of social change—which indeed is the most fundamental reason to look at a series of developments leading to a particular structure.

Approaching the present through the past also renders some help in attaining a greater measure of detachment and objectivity, particularly justified when studying a phenomenon like the Soviet Union that leaves few observers uncommitted.

One final general remark about this volume. The very scope of it (38 essays on a very wide range of topics extending over 670 pages) suggests not only the upsurge of scholarly interest in the subject but also the fact that there is virtually no aspect of Soviet reality we can as yet take for granted.

The central theme of the volume—that is, the dilemma of continuity and change in Russian history—may be looked upon as another formulation of the great debate on whether or not totalitarianism is a unique 20th century phenomenon. In most of the papers this problem is at least implicit. Another question raised by the book is whether to account for the transfor-

mation of Russian society, and indeed for Soviet totalitarianism, in terms of primarily industrial-economic factors or, rather, in terms of political-ideological ones. This may be rephrased as choice between emphasis on rationality in change (related to needs of industrialization, modernization) versus emphasis on irrational elements (ideological intransigence, insistence on doctrines, or power for power's sake, sense of mission, secular religious aspects, etc.).

The 38 papers comprising the volume were written predominantly by historians, political scientists and sociologists (9 each); the rest of the contributions were almost equally divided between economics, education, literature, philosophy.

In regard to the book's organization, one has the feeling that the topics dealt with could have been grouped differently and possibly more consistently. There is a certain heterogeneity of topics treated under the same section-heading; in some cases similar topics are treated under different headings; in others the title of the section does not seem to justify the inclusion of some of the chapters in it. It is only fair to mention that the editor was aware of such shortcomings of the volume as reflected in his preface.

The following is an outline of the contents of the volume.

### II

#### Society and Change

In the opening essay Talcott Parsons presents the reader with a generalized analysis of the structure of in-

*Mr. Hollander, who was born in Budapest in 1932, is a graduate student at Princeton University. His special interest is political sociology, particularly totalitarian systems.*

dustrial societies. The importance of motivation and values, as well as technological-economic factors, is stressed. The predominance of political agencies in Soviet industrial development is explained in part by the absence of a Western-type legal-institutional framework. Parsons joins the ranks of the experts who associate Tsarist Russian and Soviet patterns of industrialization with foreign and military policies, and the traditionality of State and imperial interests.

A. Gerschenkron also stresses the similarities between pre- and post-revolutionary economic policies. Indeed, continuity in economic development is the central theme of his paper.

In the third chapter, W. W. Eaton discusses population changes related to industrialization and changes in the socio-economic composition of the population.

#### Law, Politics and Social Change

The section opens with Z. K. Brzezinski's paper entitled "Patterns of Autocracy," which this reviewer considers one of the best in the volume. While the author recognizes important elements of continuity in social change in Russia, he appears to be more keenly aware of the differences, that is, the distinctive patterns of Soviet totalitarianism, than many of the contributors. He relates such basic differences (in the autocratic patterns) to the ideological-attitudinal factors motivating the "executive" in its basic approach toward society. He points out that while the Tsarist executive could not and did not want to eliminate all existing and potential restraints on its political power, the Soviet executive came into conflict with and successfully challenged all such restraining factors, not being committed even to a partial status quo, as had the Tsarist regime.

He also stresses the important motivating force of ideology for the Soviet leaders (p. 103): "... the conviction that they possess an insight into the inevitabilities of history. . . ." And he thus arrives at what is virtually the definition of totalitarianism: "... at this stage the distinction between political system and society, which could be made in the case of Tsarist Russia,

becomes meaningless." This is probably the most important of all discontinuities between Tsarist and Soviet Russia, at any rate insofar as the aspirations of the leaders are concerned.

Inevitably, at the end of the chapter the question of more recent transformations, particularly those after Stalin's death, arises. The author seems to be one of the few observers disinclined to believe that the level of industrialization and education attained so far will necessarily "liberalize" the political structure of the Soviet. He points out:

"... neither industrialism nor education are incompatible with totalitarian autocracy. The former itself breeds pressures for central control and direction; the latter, popular slogans to the contrary, is *divisible* and subject to manipulative controls which stress only those aspects compatible with totalitarian demands. . . . Scientific training unaccompanied by the humanities does not inevitably come into conflict with a totalitarian regime. . . . A commitment to science or industrial technology accompanied by a high system of rewards, can be used as effective blinders to social dilemmas, and political questions."

This reviewer considers the above, though out of tune with the increasingly popular views about the "inevitable liberalization" of Khrushchev's Russia, a pertinent reminder of the fact that—as we have seen in many instances — political-ideological "structures" are capable of shaping the economic "basis" of societies and not just the other way around.

L. H. Haimson, considering the evolution of political attitudes and the relationship between State and parties, points out the elements of continuity: "... State power [has] played a central role in the organization, indeed in the very definition, of social groups. . . ." and adds that "... relations among large social groups were marked by very sharp cleavages."

J. N. Hazard finds many elements of continuity in the legal system of the Soviets but also discerns the decisive change: "If one considers the relation of the Communist Party to the entire Soviet judicial system, one can find in this fact the major break in continuity, for no such monopoly party existed in

the empire."

S. Monas' paper deals with the political police, rich in tradition in Russia. As did the writer of the previous paper, he relates the institution to the Party, in order to understand its role in the Soviet Union. The apparent irrationality of police terror in the USSR—as distinct from its more moderate use in Tsarist Russia—is reflected in the fact that, contrary to what one might expect, the application of police terror showed a marked increase after the *stabilization* of the Soviet State. Monas seems to concentrate more heavily on the historical-political aspects of the political police practices and less attention is given to the peculiarity of the so-called "prophylactic" use of terror practiced under Stalin. He stresses "the sense of isolation" of the police personnel, impelling them to engender these qualities in the rest of the population. It may be, however, that the attitudes of political police personnel were more clearly determined by the structural requirements of the regime than by their sense of isolation.

"The State and Local Community" by A. Vucinich concentrates on the development of the four local communities (village, township, *zemstvo*, municipality) and on the peculiar role and character of the local Soviet. The chapter ends with a somewhat controversial conclusion:

"In the Soviet Union there are no areas of independent associative life. In the Tsarist system there were such areas, but they were the results of a traditional lack of official concern with certain domains of social activities. The Soviet system is totalitarian in the full sense of the word; the Tsarist system was totalitarian in its basic orientation, but not in its institutional make-up."

One may ask, how could the Tsarist system be totalitarian in its "basic orientation" if it could accommodate "a traditional lack of official concern, etc." It seems to be an important characteristic of totalitarian systems that there is no lack of concern, traditional or otherwise, with any domain of social life. The other question that arises is whether in a totalitarian system (or in one which is basically so oriented) there can be a separation of

"orientation" and "institutional" make-up? It would seem that in a totalitarian system the institutional make-up does, to a remarkable extent, reflect the basic orientation.

In his paper on the State and the economy, T. H. von Laue puts the emphasis on elements of continuity. In fact he comes close to summing up the entire Soviet system as a product of modernization and industrialization. One gets the impression that the roots of totalitarianism may be sought in certain types of economic conditions and transformations. M. Fainsod, in the summary of this section, comments on this chapter as follows: "Given the Bolshevik commitment to rapid industrialization, von Laue sees reliance on totalitarian methods as virtually inevitable. Indeed he tends to view totalitarianism as a necessary path for any underdeveloped country which is intent on rapid industrialization."

#### Social Stratification

R. Feldmesser's chapter on social classes and political structure is easily the most controversial in the whole volume, as it raises the complex theoretical problem of the definition of social class. Since the whole paper hinges on his definition, it may not be surprising that those disinclined to accept it will also be hesitant to accept some of his conclusions. The author is wholeheartedly in favor of a psychological—as opposed to the socio-economic—interpretation of class. To all intents and purposes he equates social class with reference group, resulting in a virtually unmitigated neglect of other ("objective") determinants. Even if one accepted his definition, it is not easy to see why he thinks that neither in pre-revolutionary Tsarist Russia nor in the Soviet Union there were and have been no social classes. It is also at least debatable whether or not industrialization and totalitarianism are unequivocally "levelling forces." For one thing, the universal functional necessity of the stratification of societies makes it difficult to believe that this levelling process can go very far, even if the criteria or basis for stratification change.

G. Fischer discusses the role of the intelligentsia in the last century; the

changes in its composition, numbers and function and also the fluctuations of the official Soviet attitude toward this traditionally important group.

A. Eden's subject is the civil service. He points out how, parallel with the loss of revolutionary dynamic, the civil service under the Soviet regime has become similar to the pre-revolutionary civil service; how rank-consciousness and differentiation has increased; and he analyses the unique new phenomenon of an administrative Party apparatus paralleling that of the "ordinary" administrative apparatus.

L. Volin, after establishing the basic continuity of the "peasant problem" in Russia over the past 100 years draws attention to the fact that "... the outstanding break in the historic continuity has been the reversal by collectivization of a trend toward independent peasant farming—the increasing proletarianization of the peasant."

J. G. Glikman analyses problems which have resulted from the shortage of a skilled industrial labor force in Russia in his paper entitled "The Russian Urban Worker—from Serf to Proletarian." In this framework he interestingly compares the economic function and status of workers in the USSR and other industrial societies.

The conclusion emerging from R. L. Garthoff's paper on "the military as a social force" is in many ways similar to that of the chapter dealing with civil servants, namely that rank-consciousness and differentiation soon followed revolutionary equalitarianism in the USSR, resembling pre-revolutionary patterns. After 1917 the professionalization of the officer corps continued and today the military is a privileged group even though it shows no signs of political initiative.

In his summary of this section A. Inkeles supplements the largely empirical findings of the preceding papers with some of his hypotheses regarding the problem of equalization, which he believes is on the increase, in the form of a move "in the direction of relative equalization of the formal status." He thinks that "the growing importance of technical problems" promotes a diffusion of power.

#### Education, Scholarship, Religion

G. Z. F. Bereday's opening chapter

focuses on the contradictions within the Soviet system of education and the interplay between official educational policy and the unofficial, popular pressures on it. He also reviews the shifts in educational policy subject not only to ideological considerations, but even more to the needs of industrialization.

H. E. Bowman's paper on literary and historical scholarship is a chronicle of the gradual attenuation of both, vulnerable as they are to the impact of the official ideology and shifts in the party line.

In "Scholarship in the Natural Sciences" N. DeWitt sketches the two main trends as follows: "They perpetrate . . . the view of unadulterated nationalism . . . as far as scientific discoveries . . . are concerned. . . ." And: "... the thesis that the process of scientific inquiry progresses to higher levels in successive stages. . . ."

In his paper on Church and State, J. S. Curtiss reminds us of the oft-forgotten fact that "The Russian Orthodox Church . . . is the only institution in the USSR that professes aims basically incompatible with those of the Soviet regime." He also surveys and documents the shifts in Soviet policy toward the Church, while the basic anti-religious core has remained the same.

N. S. Timasheff's paper on the same topic points to the important surviving elements of religious influence in the USSR. Much of the chapter is based on eyewitness accounts.

In his summary of this section S. Harcave takes issue with Bereday's thesis concerning the interaction between State and public in the field of education and points out that "Soviet educational policy is less responsive to the public will than our own is."

#### Family, Youth, Human Welfare

K. Geiger's chapter on family and social change gives justified prominence to the shifts attendant upon industrialization in all societies, affecting the structure and function of the family. He describes the Party's attitude toward the family as ambivalent. What I felt missing from this excellent essay was more emphasis on, or some interpretation of, what has often been described as a new Victorian morality in the Soviet, the rigidity of

which might perhaps be related to other rigidities in the system (apart from the obvious functions of such moral standards for general stability). One might suggest that there may be a fear on the part of the regime that too much freedom, diversity and mobility in interpersonal relations could easily be found incompatible with the authoritarian patterns characterizing the relationship of larger social units and political life in general.

V. Dunham's paper entitled "The Strong Woman Motif" deals with the image of the Russian woman, tracing it through literary works. This image managed to survive revolutionary puritanism and its temporary reduction of the differentiation between male and female character. The paper is admirable in its demonstration of how some cultural elements can weather political storms and how resilient such core-values can be to external change.

In "Youth Organizations and the Adjustment of Soviet Adolescents" A. Kassof directs attention to the vital psychological assumption Soviet youth training is based upon: "The Soviet youth program rests on the assumption that fundamental developments in personality can be brought about at a much later age." Much of his stimulating paper is organized around the poles of attitudes toward work and productivity; demands of political loyalty; and the collectivization of interpersonal relationships. He also discusses the difficulties in making youth programs and organizations effective from the regime's point of view.

K. Menhert's topic is similar to the above, with a focus on the changing attitudes of Soviet youth. A breakdown of youth according to social origins is an important feature of the chapter.

In her paper on "The Organization of Welfare Services" B. Madison presents a balanced picture of the merits and demerits of the Soviet system. In the realm of welfare policy there has been no element of continuity, linking the pre- and post-revolutionary regimes.

In M. G. Field's paper on the medical profession the reader is introduced to characteristics of the Soviet medical profession which reflect the

official value system of the USSR, in the allocation of material rewards and the relatively underprivileged position of the medical profession when contrasted with other, more production-oriented professions. The author stresses that "It is a characteristic trait of Bolshevik mentality not to leave anything to chance, even in areas as distant from the political scene as medicine and public health."

The most important conclusions in R. A. Bauer's summary appear to be that the Soviet regime's "own propaganda has created a desire for adequate welfare services." And that, in conjunction with the above: "we may anticipate that some of the knottiest problems facing Soviet leaders will involve interaction of these three components of Soviet society: the industrial system, the welfare State, and the totalitarian regime."

It is not too exaggerated to say that most of the hopes current today in the West relate to these anticipated or slowly unfolding tensions between the above components and to their splitting or liberalizing effects.

#### Personal and Social Values

In the chapter on "Russian Ethnic Values" J. S. Reshetar draws on folklore and literary sources to demonstrate such values (e.g., patience, attachment to the native land, a certain type of fatalism, etc.). He also analyzes the difficulties of the Soviet regime and the efforts it has made to combat many such values (e.g., One-ginism, Oblomovism).

In the "Russian Images of the West" F. C. Barghoorn assembles much evidence to show the persistence of traditional attitudes toward the West, such as suspicion, fear, emulation, etc. It is also in accord with Soviet policies to promote many of these attitudes.

In "The Image of Dual Russia" R. C. Tucker further explores the dichotomy between State and society which is a salient example of continuity in Russian history, interrupted only by the revolutionary period, to be followed by the "resurrection of official Russia."

G. L. Kline's paper is concerned with "Changing Attitudes Toward the Individual." He notes the important

historical fact that "in Russia the primary burden of defense of the individual fell to the *radical* rather than the liberal or reformist tradition." This of course was not without implications from the point of view of Bolshevik theory and practice regarding the collective and the individual, although during Stalin's time considerable lip service was paid to the importance of the individual (e.g., the slogan "our greatest and most important asset," etc.).

In "The Soviet Model of Ideal Youth" R. T. Fischer presents the official model, its relatively unchanging nature and the discrepancies between such a model and reality. As is also pointed out in the summary in this section, this is one of the few papers in the volume which focuses on Communist ideology. Its other value is that it systematically utilizes Soviet documentary material and its conclusions and findings are firmly rooted in such sources.

In the "Notes on Russian National Character" H. V. Dicks' approach is explicitly psychological, rich in analogies between familial and larger social and political relations, many of which are very plausible if difficult to prove. For example, some attitudes of the Party are seen as analogous to or expressive of the Russian national character, and indeed the "political" is generally treated as an undiluted expression or reflection of the strictly "personal." In any case the paper is very suggestive from the point of view of understanding some irrational features of the Soviet regime.

In his summary of the section H. Speier calls the above analogies "daring" and remarks that some psychoanalysts "treat grown-ups as eternal children."

He also has some critical comments about Barghoorn's optimism concerning the increasingly peaceful policy of the Kremlin resulting from the nuclear balance of forces.

In the concluding chapter of the book Prof. Black presents a generalized analysis of the processes and effects of modernization. He discusses the Soviet pattern of modernization in terms of the following special features: the predominant role of the State; Russia's backwardness and de-

fensiveness; and certain Russian values. Although he is obviously fully aware of the special characteristics of Russian development, he seems to lean toward an interpretation of the Soviet phenomenon in terms of the broad perspectives of modernization rather than in terms of the peculiarities of totalitarian ideology and totalitarian social organization.

### III.

Although, as the editor himself points out, the volume "makes no claim to treating all aspects of Russian society," there is a question as to the basis on which topics were included or excluded. For example, missing from the volume was a systematic and focal discussion on Communist ideology and the changes it has undergone since 1917. It would also have been interesting in the framework of such a discussion (or in any other context) to hear about the relationship between ideology (and

its different elements) and various social strata in the USSR. In a society so strongly oriented ideologically, this topic appears to be of enough importance to be treated separately.

A chapter on Russian-Soviet nationalism was also missing. Similarly, in relation to this, there could have been a discussion of Russian and Soviet diplomacy, foreign and trade relations, whose increasing importance is the best reminder of this omission.

The topic of mass media in relation to propaganda also found no room in the volume. The same can be said about the vital problem of the integration of leadership positions in State and Party organs, and the processes of recruitment. It would also have been interesting to have a chapter concerned with the position of and policy toward ethnic minorities.

It must be stated that some of the above topics were dealt with tangentially under other headings. Still, it appears that independent treatment of

certain aspects of Soviet reality—whether within the transformation context or not—is not simply a matter of how the material is being "sliced." One can only speculate on whether these omissions and the general structure and organization of the volume were more or less accidental or due to theoretical considerations. Still the impression remains with the reader that the papers might have been more closely tied together, without imposing the theoretical or conceptual strait-jacket on any single or group of contributors, or the editor. It may well be that the successful attempt to avoid the imposition or predominance of any single school of thought on the subjects treated accounts for the somewhat fragmented nature of the volume—which nevertheless is an eminently useful and rich source of information for the student of modern Russia, Soviet totalitarianism and social change in general.

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### THE MOSCOW STATEMENT (continued from page 48)

ist countries. The split in the ranks of the working class, it emphasizes, remains the principal obstacle in the way of accomplishing the goals of the working class. It goes on to say that in many capitalist countries if the working class were to overcome the split in its ranks and achieve unity of action on the part of all its contingents it could deliver a staggering blow to the policy of the ruling circles of the capitalist countries and make them stop preparing a new war. It could repel the onslaught of monopoly capital and force satisfaction of its day-to-day requirements and democratic demands.

The statement points out that the world Communist movement has become the most influential political force of our time and a most important factor of social progress. There are active Communist Parties in 87 countries with a total membership exceeding 36 million. This is a signal victory for Marxism-Leninism. It is a tremendous achievement for the working class.

Marxist and Leninist Parties, the statement says, consider it an inviolable rule strictly to observe the Leninist standards

of Party life in keeping to the principle of democratic centralism. They believe it imperative to cherish the unity of the Party like the apple of their eye, strictly to adhere to the principle of Party democracy and collective leadership, to work tirelessly to strengthen the ties between the executive agencies of the Party and the rank and file, as well as the mass of working people, and not to allow the development of the personality cult which shackles the creative thought and initiative of the Communist.

Communist Parties, the statement points out, have ideologically defeated the revisionists in their ranks who sought to divert them from Marxism-Leninism. The Communist Parties unanimously condemned the Yugoslav variety of international opportunism, a concentrated variety of modern revisionist theories. Further exposure of the leaders of the Yugoslav revisionists and energetic efforts to safeguard the Communist movement as well as the working class movement from the anti-Leninist ideas of the Yugoslav revisionists remains an essential task of the Marxist-Leninist Parties.

The further development of the Communist and working class movement requires, as stated in the Moscow Declaration of 1957, a continued determined struggle on two fronts, against revisionism, which remains the greater danger, and against dogmatism and sectarianism. The statement adds that dogmatism and sectarianism in theory and practice may also become the main danger at some stage of development of individual Parties unless combated relentlessly. Communists throughout the world, the statement points out, are united by the great doctrine of Marxism-Leninism and by the joint struggle for its realization. The interests of the Communist movement require solidarity and adherence by every Communist Party to estimates and conclusions jointly reached by the fraternal Parties at their meeting concerning the common tasks in the struggle against imperialism and for peace, democracy, and Socialism.

The Communist and workers' Parties, the statement says, unanimously declare that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been and remains the uni-

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versally recognized vanguard of the world Communist movement, being the most experienced and steeled contingent of the international Communist movement. The experience which the CPSU has gained in the struggle for the victory of the working class in Socialist construction and in the full-scale construction of Communism is of fundamental significance for the entire world Communist movement.

The example of the CPSU and its fraternal solidarity inspire all the Com-

munist Parties in their struggle for peace and Socialism and represent the revolutionary principles of proletarian internationalism applied in practice. The historic decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU are not only of great importance for that Party and for Communist construction in the USSR, the statement says. They have initiated a new stage in the world Communist movement and promoted its further development on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.

The statement concludes with these words: The meeting regards the further consolidation of the Communist Parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism as a primary condition for the integration of all working class, democratic, and progressive forces and as a guarantee of new victories for the world Communist and working class movement in its great struggle for a happy future for all mankind and the triumph of peace and Socialism.



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